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ABSTRACT
Data Center Network Placement and Data Backup Against Region Failures
by
Lisheng Ma
Rapid growth of cloud computing has enabled a wide scope of new applications such
as e-commerce and social networking. As the underlying supporting infrastructure,
data center networks (DCNs) deployed in geographically distributed (geo-distributed)
locations are becoming increasingly important. However, geo-distributed DCNs are
vulnerable to large-scale region failures due to disasters. This makes DCN protection
against region failures a critical task. Proactive protection is an important way to
ght against DCN failures by network planning before disasters occur. To this end,
this thesis investigates DCN placement and data backup against region failures via
proactive protection mechanisms.
We rst study optimal DCN and content placement with the objective of min-
imizing DCN failure probability. In this part, we combine the probabilistic region
failure model and the grid partition scheme to capture the key features of the general
non-uniform distribution of a potential region failure (in terms of its occurring prob-
ability and intensity) and to conduct network vulnerability assessment. Based on the
vulnerability information, we further develop an integer linear program (ILP)-based
theoretical framework to achieve optimal DCN and content placement with the mini-
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mum DCN failure probability. A heuristic is also proposed to make our solution more
scalable for large-scale networks.
We then optimize data backup for a particular DCN node threatened by an up-
coming disaster by properly exploring the " early warning time of the disaster, where
" denotes the time interval between the earliest moment that the DCN node is aware
of the disaster and the latest moment that the disaster indeed hits the DCN. In this
part, we investigate urgent data backup within the " early warning time of the dis-
aster for both homogeneous and heterogeneous data backup scenarios (the former
concerns with the scenario that dierent types of data are backed up to the same set
of backup DCN nodes while the latter considers the scenario that dierent types of
data may be backed up to the dierent sets of backup DCN nodes).
In the homogeneous data backup scenario, we divide our design into two sub-
problems: Backup Capacity Evaluation (BCE) and Backup Cost Minimization (BCM).
BCE helps DCN operators to nd the maximum backup capacity, and thus fully uti-
lize the early warning time to back up as much data as possible. Since the maximum
backup capacity may not be sucient for backing up all data, priority can be given to
those more important data. On the other hand, BCM minimizes backup cost by prop-
erly selecting a set of safe backup DCN nodes and routes for those more important
data. We propose both ILPs and heuristic for the two sub-problems.
In the heterogeneous data backup scenario, we propose two backup schemes: max-
imum data backup scheme (MDBS) and fairness data backup scheme (FDBS). The
former maximizes the total amount of data that can be backed up, and the latter
maximizes the same proportion of data backup for each type of data in a fair manner.
For each scheme, an ILP and a heuristic are proposed to properly select a set of safe
backup DCN nodes and corresponding backup routes.
Our proposed solutions for DCN and content placement can eectively protect
DCNs and contents against a potential region failure under the global non-uniform
iv
distribution. By taking the early warning time into account, our proposed backup
schemes can generate ecient solutions for urgent data backup against "-time early
warning disaster. It is expected that the study in this thesis can provide a fundamental
guideline to the design of disaster survivable DCNs.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In this chapter, we rst introduce the background of data center networks and
disaster threats. Then we describe the motivations and contributions of this thesis.
Finally, we give the outline of this thesis.
1.1 Data Center Networks
A data center network (DCN) is a warehouse-scale and massively parallel com-
puting and storage resource. It consists of hundreds or even thousands of servers
organized in racks, which are connected with a high-speed communication network
[1{3]. In recent years, many large enterprises (e.g., Google, Amazon and Microsoft)
have built their own DCNs in geo-distributed locations around the world to provide
cloud services [4{6]. For example, according to [7], Google has more than 30 data
centers around the world which include more than 450,000 servers and can process
more than 20 petabytes of data per day.
Nowadays, most online services are geo-distributed to serve millions of user-
s around the world such as online video, social networking, web search, etc., and
then geo-distributed DCNs make it easy for any service to become geo-distributed
[8, 9]. Based on geo-distributed DCNs, services or contents can be replicated among
multiple DCNs located at dierent network regions and services can be provided by
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the anycast service mode (i.e., a service request can be served by any DCN that con-
tains such service.) [10]. Such geo-distributed DCNs bring the following benets: 1)
a service request can be served by a nearby DCN that provides such service such that
the service cost and latency can be reduced; 2) they can improve service survivabil-
ity under failures, as services can still be supported by other DCNs containing the
replicas of these services upon the failures of services at a particular DCN; 3) they
can reduce the operating cost by exploiting the regional dierences in prices of energy
and real estate.
Due to these attractive advantages of geo-distributed DCNs, they are becoming
important infrastructures to meet the growing demands of the emerging applications
such as e-commerce, social networking, cloud computing, etc. As the trends like our
increasing reliance on online services and many applications in mobile device changing
into cloud services develop, it is believe that geo-distributed DCNs will play a more
important role in the future communication networks.
1.2 Disaster Threats
With the increase of frequencies of disasters, geo-distributed DCNs are facing
more and more potential large-scale disaster threats, both natural and human-made.
Some recent major network disruptions due to disasters include 2012 Sandy Hurri-
cane, 2011 Japan Tsunami, 2008 China Wenchuan earthquake, etc. [11{19]. Such
disasters usually aect a specic geographical region, causing failures of a set of net-
work components and degradations or even breakdowns of vital network services.
For example, China Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 aected over 60 enterprise DCNs
and more than 3000 telecom oces, as well as around 30,000 kilometers optic cables
[13, 18], and Japan Tsunami and earthquake in 2011 aected tens of DCNs and more
than 2000 telecom buildings [15, 19].
It is notable that dierent disasters with dierent features (e.g., intensity, pre-
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dictability and location) lead to dierent impacts on network. Thus, network op-
erators should consider dierent measures for dierent types of disasters to protect
network. For the natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, oods and t-
sunamis, based on climatic and environmental conditions the potential intensity and
location of those disasters can be estimated by using predictable technologies of dis-
asters [20, 21] before disasters occur. Then, network operators can take the potential
disasters into account in the network planning stage (e.g., deploying a new DCN).
On the other hand, the early warning systems for disasters are widely applied in the
world which can help us to obtain certain early warning information (e.g. aected
region and time) of an upcoming disaster. For example, REIS (real-time earthquake
information system) [22] is an earthquake early warning system deployed in Japan.
It can estimate location and magnitude of an earthquake within 5 seconds after the
P-waves arrive. Besides, national hurricane center in America [21] can provide early
hurricane warnings on a time basis from hours to days. For dierent types of disas-
ters, we can obtain dierent early warning times (from a few seconds to a few days).
Based on the early warning information, network operators can carry out the urgent
protection schemes for the network facilities that will be aected by an upcoming
disaster.
In addition to natural disasters, human-made disaster threats such as weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) attacks, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks are rising [23,
24]. In general, human-made attacks choose large cities and important infrastructures
as targets such as government, DCNs. Thus, network operators also need to consider
the possible human-made disasters in the network deployed regions when they design
the network protection schemes.
3
Figure 1.1: U.S. national seismic hazard map
1.3 Motivations and Contributions
As the above discussions, geo-distributed DCNs are vulnerable to large-scale dis-
aster threats. Thus, it is crucial to study the DCN protection measures against region
failures due to disasters, and then disaster survivable DCNs can be achieved [25{30].
To this end, this thesis focuses on the DCN and content placement with the consider-
ation of a potential large-scale region failure due to disaster and data backup in DCNs
against an upcoming disaster. Given a network, the DCN and content placement in
the network with the consideration of a potential region failure usually concerns with
the following two aspects: 1) to assess the network vulnerability due to a region fail-
ure; 2) based on the network vulnerability information, to properly place the DCNs
and contents in the network such that the DCN failure probability due to region fail-
ure is minimized. For network vulnerability assessment, the previous works [31{35]
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all assumed that both occurring probability and intensity of region failure(s) follow
the uniform distribution in the network area (Please see Section 2.1 for related work).
As illustrated in Fig. 1.1, from U.S. national seismic hazard map [20], we can observe
that in the real world, however, a disaster may happen in dierent areas with dier-
ent probabilities and dierent intensities (i.e., non-uniform distribution of a disaster).
Thus, it is desirable to capture the key features of the general non-uniform distribu-
tion of a potential region failure due to disaster in terms of its occurring probability
and intensity, and then apply them to conduct the network vulnerability assessment.
Note that since DCN and content placement with the consideration of a potential
region failure is implemented based on network vulnerability information, the previous
works [36{40] on DCN and content placement also failed to take into account the
global non-uniform distribution of potential region failures in terms of their occurring
probabilities and intensities (Please see Section 2.2 for related work). On the other
hand, in a large-scale network there are multiple paths between an arbitrary pair of
nodes, which indicates that the probability that these paths simultaneously fail due
to disaster is very small. In contrast, if a DCN hosting node fails after disaster, the
contents provided by this node will be unavailable and the adverse impact of such
failure on the DCN is even greater than the path failure. Thus, the tradeo between
failure probabilities of DCN hosting nodes and failure probabilities of requesting paths
should be considered. Also, since content or service providers in DCNs wish to satisfy
user demands with low latency, we need to consider the trac transmission delay issue
as well in the DCN design.
Data backup is an important proactive approach against disasters in DCNs by
storing multiple redundancies across geo-distributed DCNs. The existing studies
mainly focused on periodical data backup [41, 42] (Please see Section 2.3 for re-
lated work). Such periodical backup schemes may not result in high data protection
eciency under the disaster scenario, because a sudden disaster generally occurs in
5
an unpredictable manner, and thus newly generated data may not be well protected
in time due to the xed data backup period. Based on the early warning information
from the early warning systems, recently early warning time backup against disasters
was proposed in [43] and [44] to maximize data owners' utility and the number of
contents that can be evacuated, respectively. However, this problem have not been
fully explored yet. For example, backup cost as a major concern for DCN operators
to select a protection strategy and the heterogeneous data backup scenario (i.e., dif-
ferent types of data hosted at a DCN node may be backed up to the dierent sets of
backup DCN nodes) are not considered.
To address the above limitations on the DCN placement and data backup against
region failures due to disasters, this thesis studies the DCN and content placement
with the consideration of global non-uniform distribution of a potential region failure
and urgent data backup by fully utilizing the early warning time of an upcoming
disaster. The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
1. Region failure-aware DCN and content placement.
We study the optimal DCN and content placement in this part to minimize the
DCN failure probability under a region failure. We rst propose a general grid
partition-based scheme to evaluate the vulnerability of a given network due to the
global non-uniform distribution of a region failure, in which the probabilistic region
failure model is applied to determine the failure probability of a node/link. Then
we can create a \vulnerability map" for DCN and content placement in the network.
Based on the grid partition-based scheme and the corresponding vulnerability map,
we further develop an integer linear program (ILP)-based theoretical framework to
achieve optimal DCN and content placement, which leads to minimum DCN failure
probability against a region failure. To make the problem more scalable for large-scale
problems, a heuristic is also proposed to achieve the time-ecient solution. Finally,
we present extensive numerical results to demonstrate the validity of the proposed
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network vulnerability assessment scheme and the proposed ILP and heuristic for DCN
and content placement.
2. Homogeneous data backup based on early warning of region failure.
In this part, we investigate the urgent data backup for a particular DCN node
threatened by a region failure due to an upcoming disaster with the early warning
time ", where we consider the homogeneous data backup (i.e., dierent types of data
hosted at the DCN node are backed up to the same set of backup DCN nodes). We
rst formulate an ILP to nd the maximum amount of data that can possibly be
protected by fully utilizing the given early warning time ". This helps to determine
which data should be protected according to data importance. Then, we formulate
another ILP to achieve minimum cost backup by properly selecting a set of safe backup
DCN nodes and corresponding backup routes for those selected important data. To
get real-time solutions for engineering practice, we also propose a heuristic to achieve
cost-ecient backup for "-time early warning disaster. Finally, extensive numerical
results show that our solutions can be self-adaptive to dierent early warning times.
3. Heterogeneous data backup based on early warning of region failure.
In this part, we also focus on the optimal data backup for a particular DCN node
threatened by a region failure due to an upcoming disaster with the early warning
time ", where the heterogeneous data backup (i.e., dierent types of data hosted at the
DCN node may be backed up to the dierent sets of backup DCN nodes) is taken into
account. To this end, two backup schemes are developed to carry out urgent backup
within the given early warning time ", which are maximum data backup scheme
(MDBS) and fairness data backup scheme (FDBS). The former is to maximize the
total amount of data that can be backed up, and the latter is to maximize the same
proportion of data backup for each type of data in a fair manner. For those backup
schemes, we rst develop the corresponding ILP models by properly selecting a set of
safe backup DCN nodes and routes to obtain the optimal backup solutions. To meet
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the real-time requirement of engineering practice, we then propose the corresponding
heuristics. Finally, extensive numerical results show that the solutions from both
schemes are adaptive to dierent early warning times
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses the related
work of this thesis. We investigate the region failure-aware data center network and
content placement in Chapter III. Chapter IV presents the work on homogeneous
data backup based on early warning of region failure and Chapter V introduces the
work regarding heterogeneous data backup based on early warning of region failure.
Finally, we conclude this thesis, and discuss the topics for future research in Chapter
VI.
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CHAPTER II
Related Work
In this chapter, we present the previous works related to our study in this thesis,
including network vulnerability assessment, data center network and content place-
ment, as well as network protection.
2.1 Network Vulnerability Assessment
To evaluate network vulnerability under disasters, dierent models can be adopted
to capture the key features of region failures due to disasters, which include deter-
ministic model and probabilistic model [45]. Under deterministic model, any network
component (e.g., node, link, etc.) fails with the probability 1 if it falls within the
failure region due to a disaster, whereas that falling within the failure region fails
with a certain probability between 0 and 1 based on probabilistic model, and such a
failure probability depends on the intensity of failure, the distance to failure center
and also the dimension of the component (such as the length of a link).
Based on the aforementioned region failure models, some works have been done
on the assessment of network vulnerability and identication of vulnerable network
zones due to region failure [31{35]. By using the deterministic circular/line cut re-
gion failure models, the network vulnerability assessments were conducted in [31, 32].
Since under a real-world disaster the network components rarely are completely de-
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stroyed, the real-world disasters have probabilistic rather than deterministic impacts
on network components, and then probabilistic model is more suitable for network
vulnerability assessment under disasters. In [33] and [34], a probabilistic failure model
and grid partition based framework were developed to eciently evaluate the network
vulnerability. Recently, network vulnerability assessment with the consideration of
multiple simultaneous probabilistic failures was investigated in [35].
In the above works, both occurring probability and intensity of region failure(s)
follow the uniform distribution in the network area which cannot match the real-world
disasters that may occur in dierent regions with dierent probabilities and dierent
intensities. Thus, this thesis studies the network vulnerability assessment with the
consideration of the global non-uniform distribution of a potential region failure due
to disaster in terms of its occurring probability and intensity.
2.2 Data Center Network and Content Placement
Regarding the data center network (DCN) and content placement, the work in [46]
studied DCN and content placement with the objective of minimizing the network's
power consumption. To solve the scalability issue, a fully scalable DCN architecture
with distributed placement of component sets in a given optical network was proposed
in [47], which can remove the environmental constraints and also reduce the system
cost. Recently, content placement was considered in [48] to identify the optimal
placement of videos in a large-scale VoD system such that the total network bandwidth
consumption is minimized.
With the consideration of potential network failure(s), Xiao et al: in [36] studied
the optimal DCN placement problem with service routing and protection to minimize
the network cost, while ensuring fast protection of all services against any single link
failure or service failure at a particular DCN. By assuming multiple region failures
in xed locations, the works in [37, 38] concerned with the joint design of content
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placement, routing, and protection of paths and contents to achieve more ecient
protection of optical DCNs than dedicated single-link failure protection, while the
works in [39, 40] investigated the DCN and content placement to minimize both the
contents unavailability due to DCN hosting nodes damage and requests unreachability
due to paths damage from disasters. Besides, extensive eorts have been focused on
node placement problems considering minimizing the trac weighted mean internodal
distance of a network, the number of deployed nodes, cost, etc. [49{51].
The previous works on the DCN and content placement with the consideration of
potential network failure(s) failed to take into account the non-uniformly distribut-
ed region failure, and these works also did not consider the inherent tradeo among
failure probabilities of DCN hosting nodes, failure probabilities of requesting paths
and trac transmission delay. This thesis investigates the DCN and content place-
ment with the consideration of global non-uniform distribution of a potential region
failure, where the tradeo among failure probabilities of DCN hosting nodes, failure
probabilities of requesting paths and trac transmission delay is considered.
2.3 Network Protection
Network protection against region failures due to disasters can be achieved by
either proactive approaches or post-disaster restoration schemes [52]. The former
designs scheme to prevent network failures by network planning before disasters occur.
The latter utilizes resources available at the disaster time to recover network. Due to
the uncertainty of disasters, proactive approaches require a relatively large amount of
resources to achieve a desired level of protection. In contrast, post-disaster restoration
is cost-saving, but the eect is generally poor due to the best-eort nature. For
proactive approaches, the work in [38] studied the protection scheme against a single
disaster failure by providing the backup path and data center for a request aected by
the disaster. A disaster-risk-aware provisioning was proposed in [53] in which valuable
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connections are routed on no-(or low-) risk regions due to disasters such that the risk
and penalty can be reduced under such disasters, and the link-disjoint primary and
backup paths are also provided to avoid the simultaneous failures of those paths under
disasters. The study in [54] focused on the disaster-aware service provisioning scheme
which multiplexes service over multiple paths destined to multiple serves (or data
centers) with manycasting against failures of links and nodes caused by disasters.
In terms of proactive approach, data backup is an important proactive protection
method. Based on the mutual backup model in [55], some periodical data backup
schemes were proposed in [41] and [42] to jointly optimize backup site selection and
data transmission paths. Recently, early warning time backup against disasters was
proposed in [43] and [44] to carry out urgent backup within the early warning time for
those data that may not be well protected by regular backup in time due to the xed
data backup period. The work in [43] evacuated as much contents as possible from
the DCN node threatened by disaster to a single backup DCN node within the early
warning time, while the study in [44] carried out time-constrained urgent backup to
maximize data owners' utility. In addition, some works [56] and [57] focused on the
real-time data replications in DCNs whereas data generated in a certain past period
of time is not considered.
Regarding post-disaster restoration schemes, three post-disaster reprovisioning
schemes were proposed in [58] to maintain network connectivity and maximize the
trac ow in the post-disaster network. The work in [59] considered the issue of
restoration in optical cloud networks for ber link failure and then a restoration-
based survivability strategy was developed by combining the benets of both cloud
service relocation and service dierentiation concepts to restore cloud services. A
post-disaster re-provisioning scheme was proposed for telecom mesh networks in [60]
which takes fairness-aware degradation and multipath deployment into account. Un-
der a large-scale disaster, multiple network components will be aected, and then
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the failed components may be repaired through multiple restoration stages for some
reasons e.g., limited repair resources. Thus, the progressive disaster recovery is an
attractive topic in recent years which was investigated in [61{63]. Some summaries
of network protections against disasters were presented in [64{68].
In this thesis, the study of DCN protection falls into the same category as [43] and
[44]. We propose urgent backup schemes for homogeneous and heterogeneous data
backup, respectively, and our solutions can be self-adaptive to dierent early warning
times.
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CHAPTER III
Region Failure-Aware Data Center Network and
Content Placement
In this chapter, we focus on the region failure-aware data center network (DCN)
and content placement in which the non-uniform distribution of a potential region
failure due to disaster is considered. Given a network for DCN placement, a general
probabilistic region failure model is adopted to capture the key features of a region
failure and to determine the failure probability of a node/link in the network under
the region failure. We then propose a general grid partition-based scheme to exibly
dene the global non-uniform distribution of a potential region failure in terms of
its occurring probability and intensity. Such grid partition scheme also helps us
to evaluate the vulnerability of a given network under a region failure and thus to
create a \vulnerability map" for DCN and content placement in the network. With
the help of the vulnerability map and by taking into account the tradeo among
failure probabilities of DCN hosting nodes, failure probabilities of requesting paths
and trac transmission delay, we further develop an integer linear program (ILP)-
based theoretical framework to identify the optimal DCN and content placement,
which leads to the minimum DCN failure probability against a region failure. To make
the overall placement problem more scalable for large-scale networks, a heuristic is also
proposed by dividing the problem into two sub-problems (i.e., DCN placement and
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content placement). Finally, extensive numerical experiments are carried out based
on the real gridded data of U.S. national seismic hazard map [69] to demonstrate our
proposed network vulnerability assessment scheme and to validate the eciency of
the proposed ILP and heuristic for DCN and content placement under non-uniform
spatial and intensity distribution of a potential disaster.
3.1 Network Vulnerability Assessment
We consider a network with deployment area Z and denote it as a graph G =
(V;E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of network links.
3.1.1 Probabilistic Region Failure Model
A real-world disaster is usually conned in a specic geographical region. A net-
work component (like a link or node) in this disaster region will fail with certain
probability, and such a failure probability depends on the intensity of failure, the dis-
tance to failure center and also the dimension of the component (such as the length
of a link). To capture these key features of a region failure, we adopt the general
probabilistic region failure (PRF) model proposed in [34].
 PRF Model Denition :
(1) As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, the PRF is dened by a set of consecutive concentric
annuluses with radius ri; i = 1; :::;m.
(2) The ith annulus is associated with failure probability pi, and such probability
is monotonously decreasing with annulus, i.e., pi  pi+1, 1  i  m 1. Here,
the region failure is only conned within the circle area of radius rm, beyond
which the failure probability is regarded as 0.
16
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Figure 3.1: Probabilistic region failure model, m=3
It is notable that under a probabilistic region failure, multiple network components
(e.g. nodes and links) may simultaneously fail, but with a certain probability for each.
In this thesis we evaluate failure probabilities of node and link separately without any
dependency between the two. Since failure probability evaluations of nodes and links
are dierent from each other as follows, the proposed approaches can properly handle
various scenarios.
Based on the PRF model, the failure probability Pv for a node v in the ith annulus
can be formulated as
Pv = pi: (3.1)
In general, a link spans multiple annuluses of a region failure, and each annulus
contains a segment of the link. Then, failure probability of the link is determined by
that of all those segments. Therefore, the failure probability Pl for a link l can be
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formulated as
Pl = 1 
mY
i=1
(1  Pli); (3.2)
wherem is the number of annuluses in the PRF model and Pli is the failure probability
of segment li on link l that falls into the ith annulus.
Consider a segment li on link l that falls into the ith annulus. We rst divide
such a segment into multiple shorter segments, and each of them is approximated as
a node to evaluate the failure probability of li. Then, the failure probability Pli for li
can be formulated as
Pli = 1  (1  pi)
jlij
 ; (3.3)
where  is a pre-dened factor representing the length of the shorter segment and jlij
represents the length of segment li. Note that in a practical ber-optical network,
each ber link has a set of ampliers. Generally, a link failure is mainly caused by
failures of those ampliers. Similar to [35], we can equivalently treat a segment on
a particular link as a sequence of ampliers, with each approximated as a node to
evaluate its failure probability. This explains equation (3.3).
For the example in Fig. 3.1, the failure probabilities of segments on link l are
evaluated as
Pl1 = 1  (1  p1)
jl1j
 ;
Pl2 = 1  (1  p2)
jl2j
 ;
Pl3 = 1  (1  p3)
jl3j
 ; (3.4)
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where
jl2j = jl2aj+ jl2bj; jl3j = jl3aj+ jl3bj: (3.5)
Based on link failure probability, failure probability Pr for a path r can be formu-
lated as
Pr = 1 
Y
l2r
(1  Pl); (3.6)
where Pl is the failure probability of a link l on path r.
3.1.2 Vulnerability Metrics
To evaluate the vulnerability of a network, we consider the following two vulner-
ability metrics:
 NFP (node failure probability): The probability that a node fails due to
a PRF.
 LFP (link failure probability): The probability that a link fails due to a
PRF.
For a given network, one straight-forward approach to assessing the vulnerability
of a metric 4 is to rst partition the overall network area into some disjoint region
failure location (RFL) zones
 RFL Zone Denition : A RFL zone for a specied metric 4 (e.g. NFP or
LFP) is a network subarea that any PRF with center in it will always induce
the same value of 4 to the network.
For a specied metric 4, suppose that we have already divided the network de-
ployment area Z into a set of disjoint RFL zones Zn, where a PRF in Zn induces the
value 4Zn of 4 to the network. Then the overall metric 4 can be calculated as
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Figure 3.2: A grid partition for U.S. InternetMCI network
4 =
X
Zn
PZn  4Zn : (3.7)
Here, PZn denotes the probability that a PRF falls within the RFL zone Zn.
It is notable that to directly apply (3.7) for calculating a metric 4, we rst need
to nd out all RFL zones of the metric, which involves the complicated geometric
computation and quickly becomes computationally intractable for a large-scale net-
work [33, 34]. In the following section, we propose a general grid partition-based
scheme, which helps us to exibly dene the non-uniform distribution of PRF and to
eciently evaluate the vulnerability of a network.
3.1.3 Grid Partition-Based Vulnerability Evaluation
As illustrated in Fig. 3.2 for U.S. InternetMCI network [70], we apply a grid
partition scheme to evenly divide the network area Z into M small square cells.
Based on this grid partition scheme, if we regard each cell as a \RFL" zone and take
the center point of the cell as the failure center to calculate the metric 4, then we
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Algorithm 1 NFP evaluation:
Input:
Network topology information, a set of nodes V and failure model parameters.
Output:
NFP : 4NFPv evaluation for node v 2 V .
1: for each node v in V do
2: 4NFPv = 0;
3: for n 2 [1; 2; :::;M ] do
4: calculate NFP 4vZn for v by using (xZn ; yZn) as the center point of concentric
circles in PRF model with parameters Zparan ;
5: 4NFPv = 4NFPv + PZn  4vZn ;
6: end for
7: end for
8: return 4NFPv ; v 2 V .
Algorithm 2 LFP evaluation:
Input:
Network topology information, a set of links E and failure model parameters.
Output:
LFP : 4LFPl evaluation for link l 2 E.
1: for each link l in E do
2: 4LFPl = 0;
3: for n 2 [1; 2; :::;M ] do
4: calculate LFP 4lZn for l by using (xZn ; yZn) as the center point of concentric
circles in PRF model with parameters Zparan ;
5: 4LFPl = 4LFPl + PZn  4lZn ;
6: end for
7: end for
8: return 4LFPl , l 2 E.
21
Figure 3.3: Vulnerability map
can get an evaluation of metric 4 based on (3.7). Since the intensity of a disaster
may be dierent in dierent regions, a PRF with center falling within dierent cells
may have dierent parameters of ri and pi.
If we use (xZn ; yZn) to denote the center point of cell Zn, with the help of the grid
partition scheme the evaluations of NFP and LFP are summarized as Algorithms
1 and 2, respectively. Here, the number of square cells M , PRF model parameters
Zparan and the probability PZn that a PRF falls within the zone Zn can be determined
according to the information of real disaster data, such as the gridded data of U.S.
national seismic hazard map [69].
It is notable that the grid partition scheme can also help us to create a \vulner-
ability map" of a given network, in which the NFP for each node and LFP for each
link in the network are illustrated.
For example, for the network shown in Fig. 3.2, its \vulnerability map" is shown in
Fig. 3.3 (See Table 3.1 for link information and subsection 3.4.1 for related parameter
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Table 3.1: Links in the U.S. InternetMCI network
Link No. Link Link No. Link Link No. Link
0 (0,1) 11 (4,8) 22 (9,10)
1 (0,3) 12 (4,9) 23 (9,16)
2 (1,2) 13 (4,16) 24 (11,12)
3 (2,3) 14 (5,8) 25 (11,14)
4 (2,7) 15 (6,7) 26 (12,13)
5 (2,9) 16 (6,12) 27 (12,14)
6 (2,10) 17 (7,12) 28 (14,15)
7 (3,7) 18 (8,9) 29 (14,16)
8 (3,15) 19 (8,14) 30 (15,16)
9 (3,16) 20 (8,16) 31 (16,17)
10 (4,5) 21 (8,18) 32 (17,18)
settings). Such \vulnerability map" will be helpful for identifying the optimal DCN
and content placement in the network to lead to the minimum DCN failure probability.
3.2 ILP for Data Center Network and Content Placement
With the help of the \vulnerability map" of a given network, we consider here
the optimal DCN and content placement in the network to minimize the DCN failure
probability due to a region failure. The inherent tradeo among failure probabilities of
DCN hosting nodes, failure probabilities of requesting paths and trac transmission
delay is also considered in the optimal placement problem.
3.2.1 Problem Description
In this placement problem, we consider to place multiple DCNs and dierent types
of contents in a given network, and each DCN and each type of content are treated
equally. Our objective is to determine the locations of DCNs and contents in a given
network such that DCN failure probability under a region failure is minimized. Thus,
we consider the simple scenario in which the size of each type of content and the
constraints of bandwidth on each link, storage capacity of each DCN deployed node
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and the service ability of each DCN node are not taken into account. Regarding a
request for a content, we only consider the trac transmission delay to avoid the long
communication latency between the requesting node and content hosting node, and
other requirements are also not taken into account. We use the length of a path to
approximate the transmission delay of the trac along it, and formulate the optimal
DCN and content placement problem as an ILP problem as follows.
3.2.2 Notation List
The detailed inputs and variables used in the ILP formulation are listed in Tables
3.2 and 3.3.
Table 3.2: Parameters for Inputs
Notation Denition
V The set of all nodes in network G(V , E).
E The set of all links in network G(V , E).
V 0 The set of DCN candidate hosting nodes, V
0  V .
C The set of contents provided by DCNs.
 The scaling factor for adjusting the weight among total fail-
ure probability of DCN hosting nodes, total failure prob-
ability of requesting paths and total trac transmission
delay.
S The set of requesting nodes, S  V .
Rsv The set of paths between requesting node s and DCN host-
ing node v.
Nd The number of DCNs to be placed.
Nc The maximum number of replicas of content c.
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Nsv The number of paths between requesting node s and DCN
hosting node v.
 Predened constant greater than the number of contents
jCj.
PFv The failure probability of DCN candidate hosting node v
(4NFPv) obtained by \vulnerability map".
PFrsv The failure probability of path r between requesting node
s and DCN hosting node v obtained by Pr = 1 
Q
l2r
(1 Pl).
PFsv The average failure probability of paths between requesting
node s and DCN hosting node v.
Lrsv The length of path r between requesting node s and DCN
hosting node v.
Lsv The average length of paths between requesting node s and
DCN hosting node v.
Table 3.3: Variables
Notation Denition
Hv Binary variable. It takes 1 if a DCN is placed at node v
and 0 otherwise.
Hcv Binary variable. It takes 1 if content c is hosted at DCN
hosting node v and 0 otherwise.
Hscv Binary variable. It takes 1 if requesting node s requests
content c provided by DCN hosting node v and 0 otherwise.
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3.2.3 ILP Formulation
Minimize
n

X
v2V 0
HvPFv +
X
v2V 0
X
s2S
X
c2C
Hscv (PFsv + Lsv)
o
: (3.8)
Subject to
PFsv =
P
r2Rsv PFrsv
Nsv
;8s 2 S; 8v 2 V 0; (3.9)
Lsv =
P
r2Rsv Lrsv
Nsv
; 8s 2 S;8v 2 V 0; (3.10)
Hv  1

X
c2C
Hcv; 8v 2 V 0; (3.11)
X
v2V 0
Hv  Nd; (3.12)
X
v2V 0
Hcv  2;8c 2 C; (3.13)
X
v2V 0
Hcv  Nc; 8c 2 C; (3.14)
Hscv  Hcv; 8v 2 V 0;8s 2 S; 8c 2 C; (3.15)
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X
v2V 0
Hscv = 1;8s 2 S; 8c 2 C: (3.16)
Objective (3.8) (abbreviated as failure risk) minimizes the total failure probabili-
ty of DCN hosting nodes and requesting paths, as well as the total trac transmission
delay. The scaling factor  is used to control the weight among total failure proba-
bility of DCN hosting nodes, total failure probability of requesting paths and total
trac transmission delay. Equation (3.9) determines the average failure probability
of paths between requesting node s and DCN hosting node v while Equation (3.10)
calculates the average length of paths between requesting node s and DCN hosting
node v. Constraint (3.11) implies that if any content c is provided by a node v, then
a DCN must be placed at this node. Here, we use  larger than jCj to ensure that
constraint (3.11) can be properly established when Hv = 1 and 1 
P
c2C
Hcv  jCj.
Constraint (3.12) indicates a bound on the total number of DCNs placed in the net-
work. Constraint (3.13) guarantees that any content c is replicated at least twice
while constraint (3.14) limits the number of replicas of content c to its maximum pos-
sible number. Constraint (3.15) ensures that if requesting node s requests content c
provided by DCN hosting node v, node v should contain content c. Constraint (3.16)
guarantees that a request from node s for content c can be satised by only one DCN
containing content c.
In our work, DCN placement is static, which is implemented at the network plan-
ning stage for only once. However, since the information on disaster and content
properties (e.g. content request) is time-varying, content placement can be adjusted
when the information on disaster and content properties are updated. In general,
content placement can be optimized either periodically according to daily content re-
quests variation, or within the early warning time of an upcoming disaster if the DCN
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failure risk is observed higher than the current risk evaluation. It is notable that the
content requests (i.e., connection requests from requesting nodes for contents) only
depend on the requesting nodes and the amount of contents, and are independent
from the nal locations of DCN and content placement. As requesting nodes and
contents are given, the content requests can be modeled/obtained based on those
given parameters by simple statistics.
3.3 Heuristic
To make the overall placement problem more scalable for large-scale networks, we
propose here a heuristic to divide the problem into two sub-problems. We rst solve
the DCN placement problem, and then consider the content placement problem by
taking the results of DCN placement as the input.
3.3.1 Algorithm Description
The proposed heuristic is summarized in Algorithms 3 and 4. Algorithm 3 gives
the pseudo code of DCN placement, and then based on the results of Algorithm 3,
the content placement scheme is shown in Algorithm 4. Here, the notations PFsv,
Lsv, PFv, Nd, Nc, V
0, C, S and  are dened in Section 3.2.2, and let jBj denote the
number of elements in an arbitrarily given set B.
DCN placement: In order to determine DCN hosting nodes, we need to evalu-
ate the failure risk of each candidate DCN hosting node and then the selected DCN
hosting nodes induce small failure risk for connection requests. Since the connection
requests for each content are given which are independent from the nal locations
of DCNs and contents, we can use these connection requests (i.e., the information
of content requests) to evaluate the failure risk of each candidate DCN hosting n-
ode. For DCN placement, rst, we nd a content that has the maximum number of
connection requests from requesting nodes. For each DCN candidate hosting node,
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we calculate the failure risk when the content found before is provided by this node,
respectively. Then, we determine a node that induces the minimum failure risk as the
rst DCN hosting node from the set of DCN candidate hosting nodes. After that we
use the iteration to determine all the DCN hosting nodes. In each iteration, a DCN
hosting node from the set of DCN candidate hosting nodes is found which induces the
minimum failure risk when all connection requests are provided by the determined
DCN hosting nodes and this node. For a given network for DCN placement, our
algorithm can nd the DCN hosting nodes from the set of DCN candidate hosting
nodes. Then, the small failure risk is achieved if all connection requests from a set of
requesting nodes are provided by these nodes.
Content placement: After determining the DCN hosting nodes, we then assign
the contents to DCNs which should satisfy constraints (3.13) and (3.14) in Section
3.2.3. For each content, we rst assign it to these DCN hosting nodes, which induce
the minimum value of total failure probability of requesting paths and total trac
transmission delay for this content provided by these nodes. To satisfy constraints
(3.13) and (3.14), for each content, we check the number of DCN hosting nodes which
host this content. If a content doesn't satisfy constraint (3.13), we successively assign
this content to DCN hosting node that doesn't contain this content until satisfy-
ing constraint (3.13), which induces the minimum value of total failure probability
of requesting paths and total trac transmission delay for this content. If a con-
tent doesn't satisfy constraint (3.14), we successively reduce the DCN hosting node
containing this content until satisfying constraint (3.14). Compared with the original
DCN hosting nodes containing this content, we ensure that the remaining nodes bring
about the smallest gap in the value of total failure probability of requesting paths
and total trac transmission delay for this content.
In Algorithm 3, the initialization is shown in line 1. The content c 2 C is found
which has the maximum number of connection requests from requesting nodes in line
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Algorithm 3 DCN Placement (DP):
Input:
G(V;E), V 0  V , S  V , PFsv and Lsv for 8s 2 S; 8v 2 V 0, PFv for 8v 2 V 0, C,
, Nd and (sc) 2 Rc: the set of connection requests for content c 2 C, s 2 S.
Output:
The set of DCN hosting nodes: L.
1: L = ?; Riskmin =1;
2: c=argc2C maxfjRcjg;
3: for each v 2 V 0 do
4: Riskv = PFv +
P
(sc)2Rc;8s2S(PFsv + Lsv);
5: if (Riskv < Riskmin) then
6: Riskmin = Riskv; u = v;
7: end if
8: end for
9: L = L
Sfug;
10: while (jLj < Nd) do
11: Riskmin =1;
12: for each v 2 (V 0   L) do
13: Riskv =
P
(sc)2Rc;8s2S;8c2C min8u2(L
Sfvg)(PFsu
14: +Lsu);
15: Riskv = Riskv + 
P
8w2(LSfvg) PFw;
16: if (Riskv < Riskmin) then
17: Riskmin = Riskv; v
0 = v;
18: end if
19: end for
20: L = L
Sfv0g;
21: end while
22: return L;
2. From lines 3-8, for each DCN candidate hosting node v, we calculate the failure risk
for content c provided by this node, respectively, and nd the node u that induces the
minimum failure risk. The failure risk is obtained in line 4. The node u is determined
as the rst DCN hosting node in line 9. All the DCN hosting nodes are determined
through the iteration in lines 10-21. In each iteration, we select a DCN hosting node
v0 from the DCN candidate hosting node set V 0 L, and we can obtain the minimum
failure risk when all connection requests are provided by these DCN hosting nodes in
L
Sfv0g. Here, the failure risk is obtained in lines 13-15.
In Algorithm 4, we can implement the content placement to satisfy constraints
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Algorithm 4 Content Placement (CP):
Input:
G(V;E), V 0 2 V , S 2 V , PFsv and Lsv for 8s 2 S; 8v 2 V 0, L, Nc, C, (sc) 2 Rc:
the set of connection requests for content c 2 C, s 2 S and k: the minimum
number of replicas of content.
Output:
The set of DCN hosting nodes for the content c placement: Ac;8c 2 C.
1: Ac = ?;8c 2 C;
2: for each c 2 C do
3: for each (sc) 2 Rc do
4: v=argv2L minfPFsv + Lsvg;
5: if (v =2 Ac) then
6: Ac = Ac
S fvg;
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for each c 2 C do
11: while (jAcj < k) do
12: Riskmin =1;
13: for each v 2 (L  Ac) do
14: Riskv =
P
f(sc)2Rc;8s2Sg(PFsv + Lsv);
15: if (Riskv < Riskmin) then
16: Riskmin = Riskv; u = v;
17: end if
18: end for
19: Ac = Ac
S fug;
20: end while
21: while (jAcj > Nc) do
22: Riskmin =1;
23: for each v 2 Ac do
24: Riskv = 0;
25: Riskv =
P
(sc)2Rc;8s2Smin8u2(Ac fvg)(PFsu + Lsu)
26: if (Riskv < Riskmin) then
27: Riskmin = Riskv; v
0 = v;
28: end if
29: end for
30: Ac = Ac   fv0g;
31: end while
32: end for
33: return Ac;8c 2 C.
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(3.13) and (3.14) in Section 3.2.3. First, we nd the candidate placement nodes in L
for each content c 2 C, which induce the minimum value of total failure probability
of requesting paths and total trac transmission delay for contents provided by these
nodes in lines 2-9. Then, for each content c 2 C, in lines 11-20 we ensure the
number of replicas of content c to satisfy constraint (3.13). In each iteration, a DCN
hosting node u in L   Ac is selected as the content c hosting node, which induces
the minimum value of total failure probability of requesting paths and total trac
transmission delay for content c when content c is provided by this node. Here, the
value of total failure probability and total trac transmission delay is obtained in
line 14. Then, constraint (3.14) is satised by the iteration from lines 21-31. In each
iteration, a DCN hosting node v0 2 Ac is selected, and then removed from Ac. The
value of total failure probability of requesting paths and total trac transmission
delay for content c is calculated in line 25 when content c is provided by arbitrary
jAcj   1 nodes in Ac, in which the minimum value is obtained when the node v0 is
removed from Ac.
Notice that content placement can be optimized either periodically according to
daily content requests variation, or within the early warning time of an upcoming
disaster if the DCN failure risk is observed higher than the current risk evaluation.
For an upcoming disaster with an early warning time, in order to minimize content
loss, we need to re-optimize content placement within the early warning time. Since
ILP is not scalable in terms of its long running time (i.e., optimal solution may not
be found within the given early warning time), time-ecient heuristic is necessary
to produce real-time response. On the other hand, solving the ILP for optimal joint
design of DCN and content placement with transmission delay optimization is not an
easy task for large-scale networks. To this end, we need a time-ecient heuristic as
well for scalability.
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3.3.2 Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the complexity of heuristic for DCN and content
placement. The complexity of the Algorithm 3 is dominated by the iterations. The
complexity in line 2 is O(jCj). The complexity of the iteration from lines 3-8 is
O(jV 0j  jRcj) and the complexity of the iteration from lines 10-21 is O((Nd   1) 
(jV 0j   1)  jSj  jCj  Nd). Thus, the total complexity of Algorithm 3 is no more
than O(jCj  (Nd)2  jV j2).
The complexity of Algorithm 4 is also dominated by the iterations. The complexity
of the iteration in lines 2-9 isO(jCjmaxc2C(jRcj)jLj). The time for the iteration in
lines 11-20 isO((k minc2C(jAcj))(jLj minc2C(jAcj))maxc2C(jRcj)). The time for
the iteration in lines 21-31 is O((maxc2C(jAcj) Nc)maxc2C(jAcj)maxc2C(jRcj)
(maxc2C(jAcj)   1)). Thus, the total complexity of Algorithm 4 is no more than
O(jCj  jNdj3  jV j). From the complexities of these two algorithms, we can nd
that the complexity of the proposed heuristic is no more than O(jCj  jV j2 (Nd)2).
Thus, the proposed heuristic runs in polynomial time.
3.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we carry out numerical experiments based on the gridded data
of U.S. national seismic hazard map [69]. Assume that the network is deployed
in a rectangle area with length 2402 and height 1018. We rst demonstrate the
proposed vulnerability assessment scheme in Section 3.4.1. Based on the vulnerability
information of a given network, we further validate the eciency of the proposed ILP
in Section 3.4.2 and heuristic in Section 3.4.3 for DCN and content placement. For
DCN and content placement, Gurobi 6.0 is used to solve the ILP in (3.8)-(3.16). We
run the ILP and heuristic algorithms on a computer that has an Intel Core(TM)
i3-4030U CPU @ 1.90GHz and 4GB memory and also develop a simulator to emulate
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Table 3.4: Parameter settings for PRF model
g from Fig. 1.1 r1 r2 p1 p2
0.8 100 200 0.95 0.75
0.4 60 120 0.8 0.6
0.3 50 100 0.6 0.3
0.2 25 50 0.5 0.25
others 10 20 0.25 0.1
the random connection requests between nodes and contents. Given a network for
DCN and content placement, the simulator generates a random integer of x between 1
and jCj as the number of content requests from each requesting node. The simulator
also ensures that each content is requested.
3.4.1 Vulnerability Assessment
For network vulnerability assessment, we consider the U.S. InternetMCI network
in Fig. 3.2 with 19 nodes and 33 links, where the length of the shorter segment of
link  is xed as 20. To evaluate the vulnerability of network deployed in U.S. due
to the non-uniform distribution of a potential earthquake in U.S., we use the grid
partition scheme to divide the network area into 1201 509 square cells with a side
length 2 for each according to the gridded data of U.S. national seismic hazard map.
Each PRF is dened by two concentric circles with radiuses (r1, r2) and probabilities
(p1, p2). Since the gridded data of U.S. national seismic hazard map only contains
the information of grid partition and peak ground acceleration (g), we can not obtain
concrete occurring probability of a PRF falling within one cell from the gridded data
of U.S. national seismic hazard map. To facilitate the vulnerability assessment, due
to the fact that the gridded data of U.S. national seismic hazard map is obtained
based on the map in Fig. 1.1 with an exceedance probability of 2% in 50 years,
we set the occurring probability of a PRF falling within one cell as a random value
between 0.02 and 0.5. For the PRF with center falling within one cell, we take the
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(a) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the simulation
(b) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the new scheme
(c) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the old scheme
Figure 3.4: Illustration of NFP vulnerable network zone distribution for all nodes
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center point of the cell as the center of the PRF and set its parameters r1, r2, p1 and
p2 according to the peak acceleration data (g) in the cell from the gridded data of
U.S. national seismic hazard map. The parameter settings are shown in Table 3.4.
We compare our vulnerability assessment results with that in [33] and [34] and that
based on simulation, respectively. For simplicity, the vulnerability assessment based
on our proposed scheme is referred to as new scheme, while that based on [33] and
[34] is referred to as old scheme.
In our simulation, we randomly generate a location in each cell as the center of a
PRF when the PRF occurs in this cell. Other parameter settings keep the same as
above. Here, we have carried out 10 dierent simulations, and then the vulnerability
for each node (or link) is evaluated by the average of all simulation results. For
vulnerability assessment in [33] and [34], the parameters r1, r2, p1, and p2 of the PRF
are the same and xed as r1 = 50, r2 = 100, p1 = 0:60, and p2 = 0:30, and the
occurring probability of a PRF falling within one cell is uniformly distributed.
Fig. 3.4 illustrates the NFP vulnerable network zone distributions for all nodes
under the simulation, the new scheme and the old scheme, respectively. The results
in Fig. 3.4 clearly indicate that the NFP vulnerable network zone distribution for all
nodes based on the new scheme generally complies with the simulation results and
both of them match the potential earthquake distribution in U.S. as illustrated in Fig.
1.1. These results show that our proposed vulnerability assessment scheme is ecient
to evaluate the vulnerability of nodes due to the real disaster. It is notable that
since the old scheme does not take the global non-uniform distribution of a disaster
in terms of its occurring probability and intensity into account, the NFP vulnerable
network zone distribution for all nodes based on the old scheme is quite dierent from
that based on the new scheme.
Fig. 3.5 shows the LFP vulnerable network zone distribution for all links, with
Fig. 3.5(a) for the simulation, Fig. 3.5(b) for the new scheme and Fig. 3.5(c) for the
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(a) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the simulation
(b) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the new scheme
(c) Vulnerable network zone distribution evaluated based on the old scheme
Figure 3.5: Illustration of LFP vulnerable network zone distribution for all links
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old scheme, respectively. From Fig. 3.5 we can get similar conclusions as those in
Fig. 3.4. We can also observe that our proposed scheme is ecient to evaluate the
vulnerability of links due to a region failure. Based on such vulnerable network zone
distribution for all nodes or links, we can easily identify the most vulnerable network
zones, i.e., the zones in which the PRF falling within each cell has the most signicant
impact to the network nodes or links. Since our proposed vulnerability assessment
can eciently evaluate the impact to a network from a real disaster, \vulnerability
map" based on the new scheme will be very helpful for us to identify the optimal
DCN and content placement in a given network against the disaster.
In our experiments, the old scheme only takes uniformly distributed data, but
a real disaster generally entails the non-uniform case. The new scheme considers
non-uniform distribution and it covers the old scheme as a special case. By using
uniform distribution for the old scheme in our experiments, we indeed intend to show
the drawback of vulnerability assessment under uniform distribution, rather than
comparing with the new scheme.
3.4.2 Placement in Small-Scale Networks
For our proposed ILP framework for DCN and content placement, we also consider
the U.S. InternetMCI network with 19 nodes and 33 links. In our simulation, we set
 = 100 and  = 1000 (i.e., the second DCN and content placement scenario in
Section 3.4.4). We consider 4 DCNs and 20 contents, and each content has at least 2
and at most 3 replicas. All nodes in the network are set as candidate placement nodes
for DCNs. The \vulnerability map" for such network is obtained by the vulnerability
assessment with the same parameters as in Section 3.4.1. To facilitate the calculation,
we convert the values of Lsv to values between 0 and 1.
The DCN placement based on the ILP and the old vulnerability assessment scheme
is shown in Fig. 3.6(a) and that based on the ILP and the new vulnerability assess-
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(a) DCN placement for InternetMCI network based on the ILP and the old
vulnerability assessment scheme
(b) DCN placement for InternetMCI network based on the ILP and the new
vulnerability assessment scheme
(c) DCN placement for InternetMCI network based on the heuristic and the
new vulnerability assessment scheme
Figure 3.6: DCN placement scenarios
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Table 3.5: Content placement in DCNs for ILP and heuristic
ILP Heuristic
DCNs Contents DCNs Contents
3
0,1,3,4,5,8,10,11
12,13,14,16,17
3
0,1,3,4,5,8,10,11,12
13,14,15,16,17
5
0,3,4,5,7,8,9,11
12,13,15,19
5
0,3,4,5,7,8,9,11
12,13,15,19
14
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
13,14,15,16,17,18,19
8
0,1,2,6,7,8,10,13
16,17,18,19
18
0,1,2,6,7,9,12
15,16,18,19
14
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,11,12
14,15,16,17,18,19
ment scheme is shown in Fig. 3.6(b). From Figs. 3.6(a) and (b) we can nd that
DCNs are placed at nodes 3, 12, 14 and 18 for the former and 3, 5, 14 and 18 for the
latter. Besides, the failure risk is 97.49 (calculated based on the new vulnerability
information) for the former and 96.15 for the latter. Although the gap of failure risk
is only 1:39% (i.e., (97:49  96:15)=96:15) between the above two scenarios, the total
failure probability of DCN hosting nodes can be dramatically reduced under the new
vulnerability assessment scheme (the total failure probability of DCN hosting nodes
is 0.008111 for the former and 0.000438 for the latter).
Fig. 3.6(c) shows the DCN placement based on the heuristic solution and the new
vulnerability assessment scheme. The DCNs are placed at nodes 3, 5, 8 and 14 and
the failure risk is 100.21. Thus, the gap of failure risk between the ILP and heuristic
under the new vulnerability assessment scheme is 4:22% (i.e., (100:21 96:15)=96:15).
The contents hosted at each DCN are shown in Table 3.5 for ILP and heuristic under
the new vulnerability assessment scheme, respectively. Table 3.5 shows that the same
DCN hosting node determined by the ILP and heuristic contains similar contents.
From Fig. 3.3 and 3.4, we can also nd that the DCN hosting nodes based on the
ILP and heuristic under the new vulnerability scheme avoid the nodes with high
NFP and the most vulnerable network zones for all nodes. Besides, under the new
vulnerability assessment scheme we also have carried out other experiments for 10
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dierent groups of connection requests generated randomly with similar network size.
The average gap of failure risk between the ILP and heuristic is 3.5%, which conrms
the superior performance of the proposed heuristic.
3.4.3 Placement in Large-Scale Networks
To verify the performance of our proposed heuristic for large-scale networks un-
der the new vulnerability assessment scheme, we randomly generate a network by
simulator with 100 nodes and 202 links. In order to reduce the complexity, in this
experiment we only consider link-disjoint k-shortest paths between an arbitrary pair
of nodes to implement routes (k=3). The \vulnerability map" for this network is
obtained in a similar way as that of U.S. InternetMCI network. Except the number
of DCNs and contents to be placed, other parameter settings are similar to those in
Section 3.4.2.
The performance of ILP and heuristic for the cases jCj=f10, 20, 30, 40, 50g are
summarized in Table 3.6 when the number of DCNs to be placed is 4. In Table 3.7,
we show the performance of ILP and heuristic for the cases Nd=f4, 8, 12, 16, 20,
24, 28, 32, 36, 40g when the number of contents to be placed is 10. From Tables
3.6 and 3.7, we can observe that our proposed heuristic is more scalable, and the
ILP is sensitive to jCj. Table 3.7 also shows that the running time of ILP decreases
and that of heuristic increases when Nd increases, but the running time of heuristic
increases slowly. Besides, from Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we can nd that although the gaps
of failure risk between the ILP and heuristic vary with the increases of jCj and Nd,
their sensitivities to the variations of jCj and Nd are dierent. For a xed number
of DCNs to be placed of Nd=4 and when we increase the number of contents to be
placed jCj from 10 to 50, the average gap of failure risk is 11.2%. When we increase
the number of DCNs to be placed Nd from 4 to 40 at a xed number of contents to
be placed of jCj=10, the average gap of failure risk is 26.4%.
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Table 3.6:
Performance analysis in large-scale network with 4 DCNs and dierent
numbers of contents for ILP and heuristic
jCj ILP Heuristic
Failure risk
Running time
(seconds)
Failure risk
Running time
(seconds)
10 60.74 16.64 68.86 0.44
20 115.43 181.61 128.55 0.51
30 163.03 242.99 185.96 0.53
40 210.15 476.88 228.55 0.56
50 264.74 3297.55 286.57 0.59
Table 3.7:
Performance analysis in large-scale network with 10 contents and dierent
numbers of DCNs for ILP and heuristic
Nd
ILP Heuristic
Failure risk
Running time
(seconds)
Failure risk
Running time
(seconds)
4 60.74 16.64 68.86 0.44
8 60.45 12.11 74.66 0.56
12 60.67 11.86 76.76 0.61
16 60.94 11.83 79.85 0.71
20 61.21 12.62 80.32 0.8
24 61.49 11.95 78.24 0.88
28 61.77 12.02 80.05 1.04
32 62.05 12.38 79.66 1.039
36 62.34 10.39 80 1.22
40 62.62 10.14 78.22 1.49
3.4.4 Eect of Scaling Factor  on Placement
The scaling factor  is used to control the weight among the total failure proba-
bility of DCN hosting nodes, the total failure probability of requesting paths and the
total trac transmission delay. Thus, for dierent values of , we can obtain dierent
DCN and content placement scenarios. Considering the ILP with same simulation
settings in Section 3.4.2, for dierent values of , there are ve dierent DCN and
content placement scenarios. In Table. 3.8, we show the total failure probability of
DCN hosting nodes
P
v2V 0
HvPFv (abbreviated as DFP ) and the total failure probabil-
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Table 3.8: Tradeo between DFP and PFP + TD
Placement Scenarios DFP PFP TD
1 0.008111 19.31 70.07
2 0.000438 20.73 74.98
3 0.000329 22.31 79.69
4 0.000283 23.7 84.29
5 0.000282 24.54 87.26
ity of requesting paths
P
v2V 0
P
s2S
P
c2C
Hscv PFsv (abbreviated as PFP ) as well as the total
trac transmission delay
P
v2V 0
P
s2S
P
c2C
Hscv Lsv (abbreviated as TD) for ve DCN and
content placement scenarios, respectively. From Table. 3.8, we can nd a desirable
tradeo between DFP and PFP +TD by adjusting the value of  in the DCN design
phase.
3.5 Summary
We studied the DCN and content placement problem under global non-uniform
distribution of a potential region failure due to disaster in large-scale geographical
areas. By proposing a general grid partition-based vulnerability assessment scheme,
we can determine the \vulnerability map" of a given network for DCN and content
placement, which provides an important input for our proposed ILP and heuristic.
Based on the vulnerability map, our proposed ILP can generate optimal DCN and
content placement solutions to minimize the DCN failure risk due to disaster. This
achieves best-eort protection of DCN and content against the region failure. To make
our solution more scalable for large-scale networks, a heuristic was further proposed.
Numerical results showed that our work can lead to a more feasible solution. It can
well protect DCN and content under global non-uniform distribution of the potential
region failure scenario.
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CHAPTER IV
Homogeneous Data Backup Based on Early
Warning of Region Failure
In this chapter, we study the homogeneous data backup based on early warning
of region failure. We assume that there is only one data center network (DCN) node
falling within the region that will be aected by a disaster after " early warning
time (referred to as threatened DCN node hereafter). We consider urgent backup
within the early warning time " where dierent types of data at the threatened DCN
node are backed up to the same set of backup DCN nodes. To this end, we divide
our design into two sub-problems: Backup Capacity Evaluation (BCE) and Backup
Cost Minimization (BCM). The former helps DCN operators to nd the maximum
backup capacity, and thus fully utilize the " early warning time to back up as much
data as possible. Since the maximum backup capacity may not be sucient for
backing up all data, priority can be given to those more important data. The latter
minimizes backup cost by properly selecting a set of safe backup DCN nodes and
routes for those more important data. Both integer linear programs (ILPs) and
heuristic are proposed for the two sub-problems. Extensive numerical results show
that the proposed algorithms can automatically adapt to dierent early warning times
" for generating cost-ecient data backup solutions.
Ii is notable that in this chapter, data can be stored in either a distributed manner
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Figure 4.1: Geo-distributed DCNs with DCN node 3 threatened by a disaster and
other DCN nodes serving as candidate backup nodes.
(across multiple DCNs) or a centralized manner (at a single DCN). Multiple replicas
at dierent DCNs are allowed as well. Generally, a DCN backs up data or replicas
periodically in its normal operation state when no disaster presents. At the earliest
time when the DCN is aware of the disaster, some data may not have been successfully
backed up in the current period, or still in an unsynchronized state. To this end, the
work in this chapter considers to protect such unsafe data.
4.1 Network Model
We assume multiple DCNs in an optical backbone network, each hosted by a dis-
tinct node. We also assume that data is transmitted in the network through all-optical
paths where the OXCs (optical cross-connects) with wavelength converters (i.e., wave-
length conversion capabilities) are used at intermediate nodes for transparent optical
connections. Network topology is denoted by a graph G(V;E), where V is the set of
all nodes and E is the set of all ber links. There is a single threatened DCN node
that will be aected by a disaster after " early warning time. Other DCN nodes will
not be aected by the disaster, and they can serve as candidate backup DCN nodes.
Each candidate backup DCN node has a certain amount of backup storage, whereas
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online bandwidth available on each link at the disaster time can be measured by the
DCN operator. Fig. 4.1 gives an example of the U.S. InternetMCI network [70] with
ve geo-distributed DCNs hosted at nodes 3, 8, 12, 14 and 16. Suppose DCN node 3
will be aected by a disaster after " early warning time, as shown by the shaded area
in Fig. 4.1. Data at the threatened DCN node 3 can be backed up to the backup
DCN nodes 8, 12, 14, and 16. Backup cost consists of data storage and transmission
costs. The former is the sum of costs of required storage (counted in data units) at all
backup DCN nodes, where Wv denotes the storage cost per data unit at backup DCN
node v. The latter counts for the costs of working wavelength capacity (including the
costs of necessary wavelength converters) in all backup routing paths.
In general, a DCN service provider (such as Google) needs to consider the disaster
scenario at the network planning stage. As a result, multiple DCNs are deployed in
dierent geographical regions to avoid simultaneous failures [4]. Nowadays, such a
geo-distributed DCN architecture is well supported by long-haul optical inter-connects
under the WDM (Wavelength Division Multiplexing) technology. In this thesis, we
assume that multiple DCNs are aliated to a single DCN provider and there is only
one threatened DCN node.
Note that store-and-forward schemes (using safe DCNs as relays to forward data)
are not considered in this thesis. This is because we assume only a single threatened
DCN, and other DCNs (including those may possibly serve as intermediate DCNs in
a store-and-forward scheme) are taken as safe DCNs. As a result, data will be safely
protected as long as they can arrive at such a safe DCN.
4.2 ILP Formulations
In this section, we rst provide an ILP to solve BCE under the " early warning
time constraint, which can be used to determine the amount of data that should be
backed up in the threatened DCN node. For the determined amount of data that
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should be backed up, we also develop another ILP to solve BCM by identifying the
optimal selections of backup DCN nodes and routes, such that the overall data backup
cost is minimized.
4.2.1 Notation List
The detailed inputs and variables used in the ILP formulations are listed in Tables
4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1: Parameters for Inputs
Notation Denition
V Similar to the denition in Section 3.2.2.
E Similar to the denition in Section 3.2.2.
V  V The set of all backup DCN nodes in network G(V;E).
" The early warning time of disaster for backing up data (It
is quantied with the number of time units).
P = fpjp =< Sc;Dep; Lp >g The set of paths between the threatened DCN node and
the backup DCN nodes where Sc;Dep; Lp are source DCN
node (i.e., threatened DCN node), destination DCN node
(i.e., backup DCN node), and the set of links on path p.
D =< Sc; V L; V l > The data in the threatened DCN node where Sc is the
threatened DCN node, V L is the amount of data D and V l
is the amount of data that can be backed up, i.e., V l  V L
(V L and V l are quantied with the number of data units).
Re The transmission rate of each wavelength (It is quantied
with the number of data units that are transmitted by one
wavelength per time unit).
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Sv The available storage capacity in DCN node v 2 V (It is
quantied with the number of data units).
Be The available bandwidth on link e 2 E (It is counted in
the number of wavelength channels).
Wv The cost of a data unit stored in the DCN node v 2 V
We The cost of a wavelength on link e 2 E.
Aep 2 f0; 1g It equals to 1 if link e 2 Lp; p 2 P .
 Predened constant larger than maxfBp; Suv j 8v 2
V ; 8p 2 Pg.
Table 4.2: Variables
Notation Denition
Uv Binary variable. It takes 1 if the DCN node v 2 V is used
for backing up data and 0 otherwise.
Up Binary variable. It takes 1 if the path p 2 P is used for
backing up data and 0 otherwise.
Suv Non-negative integer. It is the used storage capacity in
node v 2 V for backing up data.
Bp Non-negative integer. It is the used bandwidth on path
p 2 P for backing up data.
M" Non-negative integer. It is the total amount of data that
can be backed up in the threatened DCN node within time
".
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4.2.2 ILP for Backup Capacity Evaluation
Maximize
n
M"
o
: (4.1)
Subject to
Suv  Sv; 8v 2 V ; (4.2)
X
v2 V
Suv =M"; (4.3)
X
p2P
AepBp  Be; 8e 2 E; (4.4)
M" 
X
v2 V
Sv; (4.5)
X
v2 V
Uv  1; (4.6)
Up 
UDep + 1
2
;8p 2 P ; (4.7)
50
X
p2P;Dep=v
Up  Uv; 8v 2 V ; (4.8)
Up  Bp; 8p 2 P ; (4.9)
Up  Bp=; 8p 2 P ; (4.10)
Uv  Suv;8v 2 V ; (4.11)
Uv  Suv=;8v 2 V ; (4.12)
SuvP
p2P;Dep=v
Bp
 " Re; 8v 2 V : (4.13)
Objective (4:1) maximizes the total amount of data that can be backed up. Con-
straint (4:2) ensures that the used storage capacity in a backup DCN node for backing
up data does not exceed the available storage capacity of this DCN node. Constraint
(4:3) guarantees that data with the amountM" can be backed up to the backup DCN
nodes. Constraint (4:4) ensures that the used bandwidth for backing up data on a
link does not exceed the available capacity of this link. Constraint (4:5) guarantees
that the amount of data that can be backed up does not exceed the total available
storage capacity of all backup DCN nodes. Constraint (4:6) guarantees that data
is backed up to at least one backup DCN node. Constraint (4:7) implies that if a
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path is selected for backing up data, then the destination node of this path must be
selected as the backup DCN node for storing data. Constraint (4:8) implies that if
a DCN node is selected as the backup node for storing data, then at least one path
destined to such DCN node must be selected as the transmission path for backing
up data. Constraints (4:9) and (4:10) dene Up while constraints (4:11) and (4:12)
dene Uv. Here, we use  larger than maxfBp; Suvj8v 2 V ; 8p 2 Pg to ensure that
the constraints (4:10) and (4:12) can be properly established when Up = 1; Bp > 0
and Uv = 1; Suv > 0, respectively. Constraint (4:13) ensures that the time for backing
up data does not exceed the time ".
4.2.3 ILP for Backup Cost Minimization
After we achieve the maximum amount of data Mu" that can be backed up within
the given " based on the above ILP, we can determine the amount of data D that
should be backed up. For the determined amount of data D that should be backed
up, we then develop an ILP shown as follows to generate optimal solutions of backup
DCN nodes and routes under the time " constraint, such that the overall data backup
cost is minimized.
Minimize
nX
v2 V
WvSuv +
X
p2P
X
e2Lp
WeBp
o
: (4.14)
Objective (4.14) minimizes the overall data backup cost, which consists of two
terms. The rst term is the cost of storing all data that should be backed up and
the second term is the total bandwidth cost for transmitting the data that should be
backed up. The constraints in such ILP are similar as those in Subsection 4.2.2 in
which M" is replaced by the amount of determined data that should be backed up
V l; (V l  min(Mu" ; V L)) in the constraints (4:3) and (4:5). Although the ILP for
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BCM has two terms, they can be integrated into a single objective for cost minimiza-
tion, with storage and transmission costs counted into a total backup cost. Therefore,
BCM can be taken as a single-objective optimization. Since we assume wavelength
converters at intermediate nodes (if necessary) in the network for transparent optical
connections, our ILP models can simply count the bandwidth (i.e., the number of
available wavelengths) on each link to ensure non-overlapping wavelengths.
To simplify our analysis, we assume static network status within the early warning
time. Nevertheless, this assumption can easily be extended to the scenario where
network status changes within the early warning time. In this case, we can divide
the early warning time into multiple time intervals within which network status can
be taken as static for each. Then, our ILPs can be applied in each time interval for
data backup. Similar technique is also used in [44].
4.3 Heuristic
Since solving ILP for large-scale problems (e.g. a large amount of data to be backed
up and a large number of backup DCN nodes deployed in a large-scale network) is
intractable, it is generally hard to get an optimal ILP solution for data backup in
real-time. To make our approach more scalable, in this section we propose a time-
ecient heuristic for BCE and BCM to meet the practical engineering requirement.
It is notable that to solve BCE by the heuristic, we only need to set the amount of
data to be backed up (V l) as the total available capacity of all backup DCN nodes
(i.e., V l =
P
v2 V
Sv), and then the amount of data (V l) to be backed up for BCM is
determined according to the result from BCE where V l  min(Mu" ; V L).
4.3.1 Algorithm Description
The proposed heuristic is illustrated in Algorithm 1 which includes two procedures,
i.e., Integer Data Backup and Remainder Data Backup. Here, V , Re, D, P , Sv,
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Algorithm 1 Data Backup (DBu):
Input:
G(V;E), V  V , Re, D, P , Sv and Wv for 8v 2 V , Be and We for 8e 2 E, and
the time for backing up data ".
Output:
The backup scheme, i.e., the sets of backup DCN nodes (Vb) and backup trans-
mission paths (Tp) for data D, the overall backup cost Cost and the total amount
of data that can be backed up within time ", M".
1: Set Vb = ?, Tp = ?, Cost = 0, M" = 0;
2: Set SIv = b Sv"Rec  " Re for 8v 2 V , V lI = b V l"Rec  " Re for data D;
3: Set SRv = Sv   SIv for 8v 2 V , V lR = V l   V lI for data D;
4: Call Procedure Integer Data Backup;
5: Set V lR = V lR + V lI for data D;
6: Set SRv = S
R
v + S
I
v for 8v 2 V ;
7: Call Procedure Remainder Data Backup.
Wv, Be, We, " and M" are dened in Section 4.2.1, and let jAj denote the number
of elements in an arbitrarily given set A. Note that in the proposed heuristic the
bandwidth on transmission path is assigned with the integer.
In Algorithm 1, the initialization is rst shown in lines 1-3 where we set Vb = ?,
Tp = ? for data D, Cost = 0 and M" = 0, and the available capacity of each backup
DCN node and the amount of data D that should be backed up are divided into
two parts, respectively, i.e., SIv and S
R
v for 8v 2 V , V lI and V lR for data D. Then
we call Procedure 1 (i.e., Integer Data Backup) by taking SIv , V lI and the inputs of
Algorithm 1 as its inputs. After executing Procedure 1, Procedure 2 (i.e., Remainder
Data Backup) is executed by taking SRv , V lR and the inputs of Algorithm 1 that
updated by Procedure 1 as its inputs.
Integer Data Backup: In this procedure, for data D with the amount V l that
should be backed up, we consider only to back up the amount of data V lI . In line 2,
for BCE, we select a path p (SIDep > 0) from the set P which has nonzero available
bandwidth and the ability to back up the largest amount of data, where the available
bandwidth on path p is Mine2pfBeg and the amount of data that can be backed up
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Procedure 1 Integer Data Backup (IDBu):
1: while (V lI > 0) do
2: Select a path p, (SIDep > 0) with nonzero available bandwidth Mine2pfBeg and
the ability to back up the largest amount of data based on (4.15) from the
set P for BCE (Select a path p, (SIDep > 0) with nonzero available bandwidth
Mine2pfBeg and the smallest cost based on (4.16) from the set P for BCM);
3: if (p is found) then
4: Determine a bandwidth Bp =Min(
SIDep
"Re ;
V lI
"Re ;Mine2pfBeg) on path p;
5: Set V lI = V lI  Bp  " Re, SIDep = SIDep  Bp  " Re;
6: Set Be = Be  Bp for 8e 2 p;
7: Set Vb = Vb
S
Dep, Tp = Tp
S
p;
8: Set Cost = Cost+WDep Bp  " Re+
P
e2p
We Bp;
9: Set M" =M" +Bp  " Re;
10: else
11: Exit procedure;
12: end if
13: end while
by path p is determined as
Min(
SIDep
" Re;
V lI
" Re;Mine2pfBeg)  " Re: (4.15)
For BCM, we select a path p (SIDep > 0) from the set P which has nonzero avail-
able bandwidth and the smallest cost. Here, the available bandwidth on path p is
Mine2pfBeg and the cost is determined as
P
e2p
We +WDep  " Re Min(
SIDep
"Re ;
V lI
"Re ;Mine2pfBeg)
" Re Min(S
I
Dep
"Re ;
V lI
"Re ;Mine2pfBeg)
: (4.16)
If we nd an available path p, in line 4, the assigned bandwidth Bp on path p for
backing up data D is determined as
Min(
SIDep
" Re;
V lI
" Re;Mine2pfBeg): (4.17)
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Procedure 2 Remainder Data Backup (RDBu):
1: while (V lR > 0) do
2: Select a path p, (SRDep > 0) with nonzero available bandwidth Mine2pfBeg and
the ability to back up the largest amount of data based on (4.15) from the
set P for BCE (Select a path p, (SRDep > 0) with nonzero available bandwidth
Mine2pfBeg and the smallest cost based on (4.16) from the set P for BCM);
3: if (p is found) then
4: Determine a bandwidth Bp = 1 on path p;
5: if (SRDep  V lR) then
6: Set Cost = Cost+WDep  V lR +
P
e2p
We Bp;
7: Set M" =M" + V lR;
8: Set SRDep = S
R
Dep
  V lR, V lR = 0;
9: else
10: Set Cost = Cost+WDep  SRDep +
P
e2p
We Bp;
11: Set M" =M" + S
R
Dep
;
12: Set V lR = V lR   SRDep , SRDep = 0;
13: end if
14: Set Be = Be  Bp for 8e 2 p;
15: Set Vb = Vd
S
Dep, Tp = Tp
S
p;
16: else
17: Exit procedure;
18: end if
19: end while
The above expression (4:17) ensures that the assigned bandwidth on path p for back-
ing up data satises the constraints of the available capacity of DCN node Dep, the
amount of data that should be backed up and the available bandwidth on path p.
In lines 5-6, we update the values of V lI , S
I
Dep
and Be for each e 2 p, respectively.
Node Dep is added into set Vb and the path p is also added into set Tp in line 7. The
backup cost and the total amount of data that can be backed up are obtained in lines
8-9, respectively. If we can not nd an available path p, procedure exits in line 11.
Remainder Data Backup: In this procedure, for data D with the amount
V l that should be backed up, we consider to back up the amount of data V lR. In
line 2, the path p is selected in the same way as that in Procedure 1. If we nd
an available path p, we take a ceiling function of Min( V lR
"Re ;
SRDep
"Re ) where the value of
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Min( V lR
"Re ;
SRDep
"Re ) is less than 1. Then the assigned bandwidth Bp on path p for backing
up data D is set as 1. From lines 5-13, we update the values of V lR, S
R
Dep
, Cost and
M" for two cases (i.e., S
R
Dep
 V lR and SRDep < V lR), respectively. In lines 14-15, the
value of Be for 8e 2 p, Vb and Tp are updated, respectively. If we can not nd an
available path p, procedure exits in line 17.
4.3.2 Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze time complexity of the proposed heuristic. Before
calculating the complexity of Algorithm 1, we rst give the complexity of Procedure
1. In Procedure 1, for backing up data D with the amount V lI , the iteration from
lines 1-13 is executed at most jP j times, i.e., we traverse all paths in set P for backing
up data. For line 2, since we need to traverse all available paths for backing up data
D in set P , the complexity of this operation is no more than O(jP j  jEj). Besides,
the complexity of the operations from lines 4-9 is O(jEj). Thus, the complexity of
Procedure 1 is no more than O(jP j2jEj). From Procedure 2, we can nd that it has
the same complexity of Procedure 1. Since both of the complexities of the operation
from lines 1-3 and that from lines 5-6 in the Algorithm 1 are O(j V j), the complexity
of the Algorithm 1 is O(j V j + jP j2  jEj) and then the proposed heuristic runs in
polynomial time.
4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we carry out numerical experiments on U.S. InternetMCI network
with 19 nodes and 33 links to validate the proposed ILP models and heuristic. We
assume that there is an "-time early warning disaster which will aect DCN node 3
after " time (i.e., DCN node 3 is the threatened DCN node). The number of available
wavelength channels (i.e., available bandwidth) on each link is set as a random integer
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Table 4.3: The costs of a wavelength on each link in the U.S. InternetMCI network
Link Cost Link Cost Link Cost
(0,1) 625 (4,8) 105 (9,10) 157
(0,3) 133 (4,9) 240 (9,16) 602
(1,2) 352 (4,16) 826 (11,12) 393
(2,3) 488 (5,8) 9 (11,14) 761
(2,7) 1309 (6,7) 35 (12,13) 49
(2,9) 365 (6,12) 223 (12,14) 701
(2,10) 213 (7,12) 249 (14,15) 423
(3,7) 824 (8,9) 135 (14,16) 532
(3,15) 269 (8,14) 1230 (15,16) 128
(3,16) 256 (8,16) 725 (16,17) 249
(4,5) 99 (8,18) 300 (17,18) 252
between 10 and 30. The total available storage capacity in all backup DCN nodes is
set as 2000 data units.
In our experiments, we set the cost of a wavelength on a link as the length of the
link. In particular, wavelength cost on each link in the U.S. InternetMCI network is
shown in Table 4.3. We set the cost of a data unit stored in backup DCN node as
a random value between 40 and 80. We also set  = 2000 and Re = 1. We here
consider two scenarios, i.e., j V j = 4 backup DCN nodes (i.e., backup DCNs host at
nodes 8, 12, 14 and 16) and j V j = 10 backup DCN nodes (i.e., backup DCNs host at
nodes 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16), respectively. Gurobi 6.0 is used to solve
the ILPs in Section 4.2. The experiments are run on a computer that has an Intel
Core(TM) i3-4030U CPU @ 1.90GHz and 4GB memory.
We rst provide the comparisons on the maximum amount of data that can be
backed up between ILP and heuristic for j V j = 4 and j V j = 10, respectively when
" ranges from 1 to 100 time units, as shown in Fig. 4.2. From Fig. 4.2, we can
observe that the maximum amount of data that can be backed up achieved by the
proposed heuristic is the same as that achieved by ILP. Note that the ILP gives a
mathematical formulation for the BCE sub-problem, whereas its optimal solution
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between ILP and heuristic on the maximum amount of data
that can be backed up for dierent times "
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can indeed be found by the corresponding heuristic. In other words, our heuristic
for BCE is an exact algorithm for generating an optimal solution. This is because
we assume only a single threatened DCN node. Its maximum amount of protectable
data is determined by the available storage capacity of each backup DCN, as well as
the available bandwidth on the paths to those backup DCNs. Since our heuristic fully
utilizes the available bandwidth on all paths to those backup DCNs, it can exactly
achieve an optimal solution as the ILP. Also note that this is only for BCE, and the
situation is dierent for BCM. We can also nd that the maximum amount of data
that can be backed up increases as the time " increases and the amount of data that
can be backed up reaches to the maximum value 2000 data units for j V j = 4 when "
is equal to 27 time units and that for j V j = 10 when " is equal to 28 time units.
In Fig. 4.3, we then show the total backup cost for each maximum amount of
data achieved in Fig. 4.2. For comparison, inspired by references [41] and [43], we
also show the results from the backup scheme with the objective of maximizing the
amount of data that can be backed up (referred to as Max A), which is dened here
as a benchmark of our proposed scheme in terms of backup cost. From the results
in Fig. 4.3, we can observe that Max A involves the large cost and our proposed
scheme is eective in reducing the backup cost. We also use our proposed ILP as a
benchmark to evaluate the performance of the proposed heuristic in Fig. 4.3. We can
nd that the maximum gap between ILP and heuristic is 23.9% for j V j = 4 when " is
equal to 5 time units and that is 34.9% for j V j = 10 when " is equal to 6 time units.
The average gap between ILP and heuristic is 5.2% for j V j = 4 when " ranges from
1 to 27 time units and that is 8.2% for j V j = 10 when " ranges from 1 to 28 time
units. The results in Fig. 4.3 also show that after the maximum amount of data that
can be backed up reaches to the maximum value 2000 data units, the total backup
cost decreases as the time " increases. This is because more time is available for data
backup, and thus less bandwidth is consumed. The above results indicate that the
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Figure 4.3: Comparison on the total backup cost of the maximum amount of data
that can be backed up based on ILP, heuristic and Max A for dierent
times "
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Figure 4.4: Total backup cost comparison between ILP and Heuristic for dierent
amounts of data with " = 28 time units
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Figure 4.5: Total backup cost comparison between ILP and Heuristic for dierent
times " with V l = 700 data units
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Table 4.4:
Running time (in second) for solving ILP and executing heuristic with
" = 28 time units
V l
ILP Heuristic
j V j = 4 j V j = 10 j V j = 4 j V j = 10
1000 3.072 11.587 0.168 0.281
1100 4.066 8.178 0.049 0.984
1200 5.123 7.546 0.056 0.13
1300 5.649 7.391 0.062 0.078
1400 3.041 4.75 0.037 0.21
1500 3.541 6.03 0.903 0.103
1600 2.695 5.822 0.033 0.057
1700 3.485 8.429 0.036 0.08
1800 4.254 9.845 0.034 0.065
1900 3.369 72.342 0.047 0.093
2000 1.717 3.723 0.036 0.063
proposed heuristic is ecient.
To further validate the performance of the proposed heuristic, we also give the
following comparisons of the ILP and heuristic. Fig. 4.4 shows total backup costs
from ILP and heuristic for j V j = 4 and j V j = 10, respectively when V l ranges from
1000 to 2000 data units at a xed " = 28 time units. The results in Fig. 4.4 indicate
that total backup cost increases with the increase of V l. Although the gap of backup
cost between ILP and heuristic varies as V l and j V j increase, the gap is always less
than 5%. In Fig. 4.5, we show total backup costs from ILP and heuristic for j V j = 4
and j V j = 10, respectively when we increase " from 10 to 100 time units at a xed
V l=700 data units. The results in Fig. 4.5 indicate that the total backup cost
decreases as " increases. We also nd that the gap of backup cost between ILP and
heuristic is less than 14%. The above results also indicate that the proposed heuristic
is ecient. It is notable that the results from Figs. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5 show that our
proposed scheme can automatically adapt to disasters with dierent early warning
times " for generating ecient data backup solutions.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show running times for solving ILP and executing heuristic
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Table 4.5:
Running time (in second) for solving ILP and executing heuristic with
V l = 700 data units
"
ILP Heuristic
j V j = 4 j V j = 10 j V j = 4 j V j = 10
10 5.224 5.969 0.197 0.312
20 1.411 3.683 0.056 1.027
30 3.525 5.138 0.048 0.087
40 1.917 2.635 0.061 0.082
50 2.159 2.867 1.077 0.083
60 1.505 3.069 0.039 0.081
70 1.442 2.502 0.04 0.052
80 2.942 4.414 0.036 0.18
90 1.519 3.088 0.036 0.058
100 1.633 2.458 0.03 0.126
in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. We can observe that the time for solving ILP
increases with the increase of j V j. In particular, the time for solving ILP reaches
to the maximum value that more than 72 seconds when V l = 1900 and j V j = 10.
However, the time for executing heuristic increases slowly with the increases of j V j
and V l and thus the proposed heuristic is more scalable. Since the time for executing
heuristic is small for large-scale backup problems, we can achieve a real-time solution
based on the proposed heuristic to meet the practical engineering requirement against
an "-time early warning disaster. For example, under the above mentioned hardware
settings (i.e., an Intel Core(TM) i3-4030U CPU @ 1.90GHz and 4GB memory), the
proposed heuristic can provide backup schemes for all the scenarios in Fig. 4.4 against
a disaster with "=29 time units early warning time.
4.5 Summary
We studied the minimum cost data backup in geo-distributed DCNs against an
"-time early warning disaster under a given set of backup resources. Two sets of
algorithms were proposed, each consisting of an optimal ILP and a corresponding
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heuristic. With the " early warning time constraint, the rst set of algorithms can
help DCN operators to evaluate the maximum backup capacity under the limited
amount of backup resources, and the second set of algorithms can minimize backup
cost by properly selecting a set of backup DCN nodes and corresponding backup
routes. By properly exploring the " early warning time, the proposed scheme can be
more exible and adaptive to disasters as compared with existing periodical backup
and real-time replication schemes. Our scheme allows simultaneous data backup from
the threatened DCN node to multiple safe DCN nodes in the disaster-disjoint zones.
It was shown that the optimal solution changes with dierent early warning times ",
indicating that the proposed scheme is disaster adaptive under dierent values of ".
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CHAPTER V
Heterogeneous Data Backup Based on Early
Warning of Region Failure
In this chapter, we investigate the heterogeneous data backup based on early
warning of region failure. Similar to Chapter IV, we also assume that there is only
one data center network (DCN) node (i.e., threatened DCN node) falling within the
region that will be aected by a disaster after " early warning time. We consider
urgent backup within the early warning time " where dierent types of data at the
threatened DCN node may be backed up to the dierent sets of backup DCN nodes.
To this end, by fully utilizing the " early warning time, we propose two backup
schemes which are maximum data backup scheme (MDBS) and fairness data backup
scheme (FDBS). The former is to maximize the total amount of data that can be
backed up, and the latter is to maximize the same proportion of data backup for
each type of data in a fair manner. Corresponding integer linear program (ILP) and
heuristic are developed for each scheme. Extensive numerical results show that the
proposed schemes can exibly provide dierent data backup solutions against the
disasters with dierent early warning times. Note that the allowed storage manner
of data in this chapter is similar to that in Chapter IV.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of one threatened DCN node and six candidate backup DCN
nodes in geo-distributed DCNs under disaster
5.1 Network Model
We consider the similar network scenario as that in Chapter IV. The network
topology is also modeled as a graph G(V;E), where V is the set of all nodes and E
is the set of all ber links. We also assume that there is a single threatened DCN
node in the network. The backup DCN nodes are selected from the other safe DCN
nodes under disaster. Each candidate backup DCN node has a certain amount of
backup storage, whereas the available wavelengths on each network link for backup
routing can be measured by the DCN operator at the disaster time. Fig. 5.1 gives
an example of the U.S. InternetMCI network [70] with seven geo-distributed DCNs
hosted at nodes 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14 and 16. Suppose there is a sudden disaster will
aect the DCN node 3 area after " early warning time, as shown by the shaded area
in Fig. 5.1 and there are four types of data that should be backed up in the DCN
node 3. Then, four dierent backup requirements are formed in such network, i.e.,
fdata ID, fbackup DCN node listgg (e.g., f1, f8, 12gg, f2, f7, 14gg, f3, f11, 16gg,
f4, f7, 8gg). Note that similar to Chapter IV, store-and-forward schemes are also
not considered in this chapter.
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5.2 ILP Formulations
In this section, we provide two ILPs for MDBS and FDBS under the early warning
time constraint, respectively.
5.2.1 Notation List
The detailed inputs and variables used in the ILP formulations are listed in Tables
5.1 and 5.2.
Table 5.1: Parameters for Inputs
Notation Denition
V Similar to the denition in Section 3.2.2.
E Similar to the denition in Section 3.2.2.
V  V Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
" Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
P = fpjp =< Scp; Dep; Lp >g Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
Re Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
Sv Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
Be Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
Ape 2 f0; 1g Similar to the denition in Section 4.2.1.
D0 = fdjd =< Cd; Bund; Pd >g The set of dierent types of data at the threatened
DCN node, where Cd is the amount of the type of
data d that should be backed up (It is quantied
with the number of data units), Bund  V is a set
of candidate backup DCN nodes for backing up the
type of data d and Pd  P is a set of possible paths
for backing up the type of data d.
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 Predened constant greater than maxfBdp ; Sudv j
8d 2 D0; 8v 2 Bund; 8p 2 Pdg.
Table 5.2: Variables
Notation Denition
Udv Binary variable. It takes 1 if the DCN node v 2 Bund is used for
backing up the type of data d 2 D0 and 0 otherwise.
Udp Binary variable. It takes 1 if path p 2 Pd is used for backing up the
type of data d 2 D0 and 0 otherwise.
Sudv Non-negative integer. It is the used storage capacity in DCN node
v 2 Bund for backing up the type of data d 2 D0.
Bdp Non-negative integer. It is the used bandwidth on path p 2 Pd for
backing up the type of data d 2 D0.
 Non-negative integer (0 <   N;N = 10n, integer n  2). 
N
is the
same proportion of data backup for each type of data in set D0.
5.2.2 ILP for Maximum Data Backup Scheme
Maximize
nX
d2D0
X
v2Bund
Sudv
o
: (5.1)
Subject to
X
v2Bund
Sudv  Cd; 8d 2 D0; (5.2)
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X
d2D0
Sudv  Sv; 8v 2 V ; (5.3)
X
d2D0
X
p2Pd
ApeB
d
p  Be;8e 2 E; (5.4)
X
v2Bund
Udv  1;8d 2 D0; (5.5)
Udp 
UdDep + 1
2
;8d 2 D0;8Dep 2 Bund;8p 2 Pd; (5.6)
X
p2Pd;Dep=v
Udp  Udv ;8d 2 D0;8v 2 Bund; (5.7)
Udp  Bdp ;8d 2 D0;8p 2 Pd; (5.8)
Udp  Bdp=; 8d 2 D0; 8p 2 Pd; (5.9)
Udv  Sudv;8d 2 D0;8v 2 Bund; (5.10)
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Udv  Sudv=; 8d 2 D0; 8v 2 Bund; (5.11)
SudvP
p2Pd;Dep=v
Bdp
 " Re; 8d 2 D0;8v 2 Bund: (5.12)
Objective (5.1) maximizes the total amount of data that can be backed up at
the threatened DCN node. Constraint (5.2) limits the total amount of each type of
data that is backed up to its maximum possible amount. Constraint (5.3) ensures
that the used storage capacity for backing up data in each backup DCN node v 2 V
does not exceed the available storage capacity of such DCN node. Constraint (5.4)
ensures that the used bandwidth for backing up data on a link does not exceed the
available capacity on this link. Constraint (5.5) guarantees that each type of data is
backed up to at least one backup DCN node. Constraint (5.6) implies that if a path
p 2 Pd is selected for backing up the type of data d 2 D0 , then the destination node
of this path Dep 2 Bund must be selected as the backup DCN node for storing such
type of data. Constraint (5.7) implies that if a DCN node is selected as the backup
DCN node for backing up the type of data d 2 D0, then at least one path must be
selected as the transmission path for backing up this type of data in such DCN node.
Constraints (5.8) and (5.9) dene Udp whereas constraints (5.10) and (5.11) dene U
d
v .
Constraint (5.12) ensures that the time for backing up each type of data does not
exceed the given backup time ".
5.2.3 ILP for Fairness Data Backup Scheme
The objective of the ILP for FDBS is to maximize  as formulated in (5.13), such
that the same proportion of data backup for each type of data d 2 D0 ( i.e., 
N
) is
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maximized.
Maximize fg: (5.13)
The constraints of the ILP include constraints (5.3)-(5.12) in the ILP for MDBS and
the following new constraints (5.14) and (5.15) which determine the amount of each
type of data that should be backed up.
X
v2Bund
Sudv 

N
 Cd   1;8d 2 D0; (5.14)
X
v2Bund
Sudv 

N
 Cd;8d 2 D0: (5.15)
Since the amount of each type of data that can be backed up is set as an integer, there
may be a gap between
P
v2Bund
Sudv and

N
Cd for each type of data d 2 D0. However, the
gap will not be greater than 1. Note that the assumptions of wavelength converters
at intermediate nodes (if necessary) in the network and static network status within
the early warning time are the same as those assumed in Chapter IV.
5.3 Heuristics
Since solving ILP for large-scale problems (e.g. more types of data that should
be backed up) induces the high time complexity, it is generally dicult to obtain
an optimal solution based on ILP for data backup within a limited time. To make
our schemes more scalable, in this section we propose time-ecient heuristics for
MDBS (i.e., Algorithm 1) and FDBS (i.e., Algorithm 2) to get the real-time solutions,
respectively. In these algorithms, V , Re, D0, P , Sv, Be, ", n and N are dened in
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Algorithm 1 Maximum Data Backup Scheme (MDBS):
Input:
G(V;E), V  V , Re, D0, P , Sv for 8v 2 V , Be for 8e 2 E, and the time for
backing up data ".
Output:
The backup scheme, i.e., the sets of backup DCN nodes (V db ) and backup trans-
mission paths (T dp ) for each type of data d 2 D0, and the amount of each type of
data d 2 D0 that can be backed up within the time ", Md.
1: V db = , T
d
p =  , Md = 0 for 8d 2 D0, P 0 = P , Flag = 1;
2: Call Procedure 1 Data Backup A;
3: Call Procedure 2 Data Backup B.
Section 5.2.1, and the bandwidth on transmission path is assigned with the integer.
We also use jj to denote the number of elements in a given set .
5.3.1 Heuristic for Maximum Data Backup Scheme
The proposed heuristic for MDBS is illustrated in Algorithm 1. To achieve the
maximum amount of data that can be backed up, the iterative method is adopted. In
each iteration, for each path p in set P we calculate the amount of data that can be
backed up through path p within the given early warning time ", where the amount
of data that can be backed up through path p depends on the type of data with
the maximum amount at the threatened DCN node that can be backed up to the
destination node of path p, the available storage capacity in the destination node of
path p and the available bandwidth on path p. Then we can select a path that can
be used to back up the maximum amount of data from set P to execute backup. In
Algorithm 1, we rst set V db = ?, T dp = ?, Md = 0, P 0 = P and Flag = 1 in line
1. Then the Procedure 1 (i.e., Data Backup A) is executed by taking the inputs of
Algorithm 1 as its inputs. After executing Procedure 1, we call Procedure 2 (i.e.,
Data Backup B) by taking the updated inputs of Algorithm 1 by Procedure 1 as its
inputs.
Data Backup A: In this procedure, we back up the amount of data "  Re  Bt,
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Procedure 1 Data Backup A:
1: while (Flag = 1) do
2: Select a path p with the nonzero maximum available bandwidth to back up
data based on (5.16) from the set P 0;
3: if (p is found) then
4: Determine a bandwidth Bd
p
max
p on path p for backing up the type of data d
p
max
based on (5.16);
5: Set Cdpmax = Cdpmax  Bd
p
max
p  " Re, SDep = SDep  Bd
p
max
p  " Re;
6: Set Be = Be  Bdpmaxp for 8e 2 p;
7: Set V d
p
max
b = V
dpmax
b
S
Dep, T
dpmax
p = T
dpmax
p
S
p;
8: Set Mdpmax =Mdpmax +B
dpmax
p  " Re;
9: else
10: Set Flag=0;
11: end if
12: end while
where Bt denotes the total number of wavelengths that are selected for backing up
data. For a path p that is selected to back up data, we use dpmax to denote the type of
data with the maximum amount Cdpmax in set D
0 that can be backed up to the backup
DCN node Dep. In line 2, we select a path p with the nonzero maximum available
bandwidth to back up data from set P 0 (i.e., which can be used to back up the
maximum amount of data). Here, the available bandwidth on path p is Mine2pfBeg
and the maximum available bandwidth on path p for backing up data is determined
as
Min
j SDep
" Re
k
;
jCdpmax
" Re
k
;Mine2pfBeg

: (5.16)
The above expression (5:16) ensures that the assigned bandwidth on path p for back-
ing up data dpmax satises the constraints of the available capacity of DCN node Dep,
the amount of data Cdpmax and the available bandwidth on path p. If we can nd an
available path p, in line 4 the bandwidth Bd
p
max
p on path p for backing up data d
p
max
is obtained based on (5.16). We update the values of Cdpmax , SDep and Be for each
e 2 p in lines 5-6, respectively and then we add the node Dep and path p into the sets
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Procedure 2 Data Backup B:
1: while (Flag = 0) do
2: Select a path p from the set P 0 with nonzero available bandwidth Mine2pfBeg
which can be used to back up the nonzero maximum amount of data based on
(5.17);
3: if (p is found) then
4: Determine the amount of the type of data dpmax that can be backed up through
path p based on (5.17);
5: Determine a bandwidth Bd
p
max
p = 1 on path p for backing up the type of data
dpmax ;
6: Set Cdpmax = Cdpmax  Min(Cdpmax ; SDep), SDep = SDep  Min(Cdpmax ; SDep);
7: Set Be = Be  Bdpmaxp for 8e 2 p;
8: Set V d
p
max
b = V
dpmax
b
S
Dep, T
dpmax
p = T
dpmax
p
S
p;
9: Set Mdpmax =Mdpmax +Min(Cdpmax ; SDep);
10: else
11: Set Flag=1;
12: end if
13: end while
V d
p
max
b and T
dpmax
p in line 7, respectively. The total amount of data d
p
max (i.e., Mdpmax)
that is backed up to the backup DCN nodes is obtained in line 8. If we can not nd
an available path p, the procedure exits.
Data Backup B: In this procedure, we back up the remaining amount of each
type of data in set D0. In line 2, we select a path p with nonzero available bandwidth
from set P 0 which can be used to back up the nonzero maximum amount of data.
Min

Cdpmax ; SDep

: (5.17)
If we can nd an available path p, the maximum amount of data that can be backed
up through path p is determined by (5.17) in line 4 and the bandwidth on path p
for backing up the type of data dpmax is set as 1 in line 5. Then, in lines 6-9 we can
execute the similar operations as those in lines 5-8 of Procedure 1. If we can not nd
an available path p, the procedure exits.
Complexity of the heuristic: In Algorithm 1, the complexity of the operation
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in line 1 is O(Max(jD0j+ jP j)). Then we analyze the complexity of Procedure 1. In
Procedure 1, the while-loop from lines 1-12 is executed at most jP j times for backing
up data, i.e., we need to use each path in set P 0 to back up data in the worst case
scenario. In order to select a path p from set P 0 in line 2, we need to traverse all
available paths for backing up data in set P 0, and for each traversed path p, we need
to traverse all types of data in set D0 that can be backed up to the backup DCN
node Dep. Thus, the complexity of line 2 is no more than O(jP j  jEj  jD0j). The
time complexity for update from lines 5-8 is O(jEj). Thus, the time complexity of
Procedure 1 is no more than O(jP j2 jEj  jD0j). Besides, since Procedure 2 has the
same complexity of Procedure 1, the overall time complexity of the Algorithm 1 is
O(jP j2  jEj  jD0j).
5.3.2 Heuristic for Fairness Data Backup Scheme
The proposed heuristic for FDBS is illustrated in Algorithm 2. To achieve the
data backup for each type of data d 2 D0 in a fair manner, we maximize the same
proportion of data backup for each type of data in set D0 within the early warning
time " (X) by using the idea of binary search. For each type of data d 2 D0, the
backup operation is implemented by the Procedures 1 and 2. When we back up the
type of data d 2 D0, the set P 0 and the data dpmax; p 2 P 0 in those procedures are
set as Pd and d, respectively. In Algorithm 2, the initialization is rst shown in lines
1-4, where we use C 0d; S
0
v and B
0
e to save the initial values of the amount of the type
of data d 2 D0, the available storage capacity of the backup DCN node v 2 V and
the available bandwidth on link e 2 E, respectively. The while-loop from lines 5-28
executes the binary search to nd the maximum proportion X. In each loop, we rst
execute the initialization operations from lines 6-11 where the amount of each type
of data d 2 D0 that should be backed up is determined by the proportion 
N
. Then,
according to the determined amount of each type of data d 2 D0, we sort dierent
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Algorithm 2 Fairness Data Backup Scheme (FDBS):
Input:
G(V;E), V  V , Re, D0, P , Sv for 8v 2 V , Be for 8e 2 E, the integer N (n  2)
and the time for backing up data ".
Output:
The backup scheme, i.e., the sets of backup DCN nodes (V db ) and backup trans-
mission paths (T dp ) for each type of data d 2 D0, the amount of each type of data
d 2 D0 that can be backed up within the time ", Md, and the maximum same
proportion of data backup for each type of data in set D0 within the time ", X.
1: Set low = 0, high = N ;
2: Set C 0d = Cd for 8d 2 D0;
3: Set S 0v = Sv for 8v 2 V ;
4: Set B0e = Be for 8e 2 E;
5: while (low <= high) do
6: Set Sv = S
0
v for 8v 2 V ;
7: Set Be = B
0
e for 8e 2 E;
8: Set Cd = C
0
d, V
d
b =  and T
d
p =  for 8d 2 D0;
9: Set  = b(low + high)=2c, Flag = 1;
10: Set Cd = bCdN c for 8d 2 D0;
11: Set Total =
P
d2D0
Cd;
12: Sort dierent types of data in set D0 in a descending order according to the
amount of each type of data (i.e., Cd; 8d 2 D0);
13: for (8d 2 D0) do
14: Set P 0 = Pd;
15: Call Procedure 1 Data Backup A;
16: end for
17: Sort dierent types of data in set D0 in a descending order according to the
remaining amount of each type of data (i.e., Cd;8d 2 D0);
18: for (8d 2 D0) do
19: Set P 0 = Pd;
20: Call Procedure 2 Data Backup B;
21: end for
22: if (Total =
P
d2D0
Md) then
23: Set low =  + 1;
24: Set 0 = ;
25: else
26: Set high =    1;
27: end if
28: end while
29: Set X=Mind2D0(bC
0
d0
N
c=C 0d).
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Procedure 3 Data Backup C:
1: for each path p 2 P 0 do
2: Determine a bandwidth Bd
p
max
p on path p for backing up the type of data d
p
max
based on (5.18);
3: if (Bd
p
max
p > 0) then
4: Set C 0 =Min(Cdpmax ; SDep ; B
dpmax
p  " Re);
5: Set Cdpmax = Cdpmax   C 0, SDep = SDep   C 0;
6: Set Be = Be  Bdpmaxp for 8e 2 p;
7: Set V d
p
max
b = V
dpmax
b
S
Dep, T
dpmax
p = T
dpmax
p
S
p;
8: Set Mdpmax =Mdpmax + C
0;
9: end if
10: end for
types of data in set D0 in a descending order in line 12. Following, for each type
of data in set D0, the backup operation is executed by calling Procedure 1 in lines
13-16. From lines 17-21, the similar operations are executed as those in lines 12-16
for the remaining amount of each type of data d 2 D0, where Procedure 2 is called.
After that if the determined amount of each type of data d 2 D0 in line 10 can be
backed up within the time ", we change the search scope from  + 1 to high in line
23. Otherwise, we change the search scope from low to    1 in line 26. At last, the
maximum proportion X can be obtained in line 29.
Complexity of the heuristic: In Algorithm 2, the complexity of the initial-
ization operations from lines 1-4 is O(Max(jD0j; j V j; jEj)). The while-loop from
lines 5-28 is executed log2N(N = 10
n) times. In the loop, the complexity of the
operations from lines 6-11 is O(Max(jD0j; j V j; jEj)) and the complexity for sorting
data is at most O(jD0j2). Then, since both of the complexities of Procedures 1
and 2 for solving FDBS are O(jP j2  jEj), the overall complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O(log2N(jD0j2 +Max(jD0j; j V j; jEj) + jD0j  jP j2  jEj)).
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Table 5.3: Backup requirements
jD0j = 4 jD0j = 8
Data ID Backup DCNs Data ID Backup DCNs
1 8, 12 1 8, 12
2 7, 14 2 7, 14
3 11, 16 3 11, 16
4 7, 12 4 7, 12
5 12, 16
6 7, 14
7 14, 16
8 8, 11
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we simulate MDBS and FDBS on U.S. InternetMCI network to
implement urgent backup. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the network includes 19 nodes and
33 links, and there are seven DCNs hosted at the network. We assume that each link
in the network has a number of available wavelength channels which is determined
by randomly generating an integer between 10 and 30. We also assume that an
upcoming disaster will aect the DCN node 3 area and dierent types of data at this
node should be backed up within the " early warning time, where the amount of each
type of data is set as a random integer between 100 and 300 data units.
In our experiments, we set  = 1000, Re = 1 and n = 2. We consider two
scenarios (i.e., jD0j = 4 and jD0j = 8) for the backup problem, respectively. Here, the
total available storage capacity in all backup DCN nodes is set as 1400 data units for
jD0j = 4 and 2000 data units for jD0j = 8. The backup requirements from dierent
types of data for jD0j = 4 and jD0j = 8 are shown in Table 5.3. Gurobi 6.0 is used
to solve the ILPs in Section 5.2. The experiments are run on a computer that has an
Intel Core(TM) i3-4030U CPU @ 1.90GHz and 4GB memory.
In Fig. 5.2, we rst show the results on the maximum amount of data that
can be backed up obtained by MDBS and FDBS based on ILPs for jD0j = 4 and
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Figure 5.2: Comparison between MDBS and FDBS on the maximum amount of data
that can be backed up based on ILPs for dierent times "
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Figure 5.3: Comparison on the total amount of data that can be backed up from
MDBS based on ILP, heuristic and strawman for dierent times "
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Figure 5.4: Comparison between ILP and heuristic on the amount of each type of
data that can be backed up from MDBS with " = 10 time units
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jD0j = 8, respectively under dierent times ". The results in Fig. 5.2 indicate that
the maximum amount of data that can be backed up increases with the increase of
the time ". We can also observe that the maximum amount of data that can be
backed up obtained by FDBS is less than (or equal to) that obtained by MDBS in
both cases, and the gap between MDBS and FDBS increases with the increase of jD0j.
This is because that the objective of MDBS is to maximize the total amount of data
that can be backed up by fully utilizing the available resources and then the upper
bound of the amount of data that can be backed up within the given early warning
time can be achieved, but FDBS needs to ensure the same proportion of data backup
for each type of data which may not fully utilize the available resources and thus the
upper bound of the amount of data that can be backed up cannot be always reached
for any case based on FDBS.
To validate the eectiveness of our proposed heuristics for MDBS and FDBS, we
also provide simple algorithms to solve MDBS and FDBS (referred to as strawman
algorithms), respectively. Strawman algorithms are obtained by only calling Proce-
dure 3 in Algorithms 1 and 2, and removing the sort operation in Algorithm 2 as well.
In such Procedure 3, we successively select an available path from set P to back up
data, and the bandwidth on path p for backing up data is determined by (5.18). The
other operations are similar to those in Procedures 1 and 2.
Min
l SDep
" Re
m
;
lCdpmax
" Re
m
;Mine2pfBeg

: (5.18)
We then provide the results obtained by MDBS based on ILP, heuristic and s-
trawman algorithm for jD0j = 4 and jD0j = 8, respectively under dierent times ", as
shown in Fig. 5.3, which use to validate the eectiveness of the proposed heuristic
for MDBS. From Fig. 5.3(a), we can nd that the total amount of data that can be
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backed up obtained by heuristic within the given early warning time is the same as
that obtained by ILP when jD0j = 4. From Fig. 5.3(b), we can observe that there is
a gap between ILP and heuristic when jD0j = 8, but the maximum gap is less than
7.2% which indicates that the gap varies within a moderate scale. The results in Figs.
5.3(a) and (b) also indicate that the heuristic outperforms the strawman algorithm.
Thus, the proposed heuristic for MDBS is ecient.
Fig. 5.4 shows the amount of each type of data that can be backed up obtained
by MDBS based on ILP and heuristic for two cases (i.e., jD0j = 4 and jD0j = 8)
when " = 10 time units, respectively. From the results in Fig. 5.4, we can nd that
although the total amount of data that can be backed up obtained by heuristic is the
same as that obtained by ILP for the both cases when " = 10 time units, the amount
of each type of data that can be backed up is dierent between heuristic and ILP. The
results also indicate that MDBS leads to the dierential backup for dierent types of
data.
To validate the eectiveness of the proposed heuristic for FDBS, in Fig. 5.5 we
also present the results on the same proportion of data backup for each type of data
achieved by FDBS based on ILP, heuristic and strawman algorithm for jD0j = 4 and
jD0j = 8, respectively under dierent times ". From the results in Fig. 5.5, we can
observe that the same proportion of data backup for each type of data obtained by
heuristic is similar to that obtained by ILP when jD0j = 4, and although the gap
of the proportion between ILP and heuristic increases with the increase of jD0j, this
gap is less than 10% when jD0j = 8. We can also nd that the heuristic is much
better than the strawman algorithm. Thus, the proposed heuristic for FDBS is also
ecient. The results in Figs. 5.3 and 5.5 also indicate that the proposed schemes can
automatically adapt to dierent early warning times.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show running times for solving ILP and executing heuristic
in Figs. 5.3 and 5.5, respectively. From those tables, we can nd that the time for
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Figure 5.5: Comparison on the same proportion of data backup for each type of data
from FDBS based on ILP, heuristic and strawman for dierent times "
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Table 5.4:
Running time (in second) for solving ILP and executing heuristic with
jD0j = 4
"
ILP Heuristic
MDBS FDBS MDBS FDBS
1 1.476 3.947 0.241 0.326
3 1.231 2.397 0.085 0.15
6 0.708 4.505 0.07 0.056
9 0.6429 5.203 0.132 0.08
12 0.63 1.58 0.116 0.061
15 0.563 1.64 0.055 0.049
Table 5.5:
Running time (in second) for solving ILP and executing heuristic with
jD0j = 8
"
ILP Heuristic
MDBS FDBS MDBS FDBS
1 5.602 7.871 0.268 0.513
3 6.174 8.285 0.051 0.208
6 3.342 16.454 0.06 0.089
9 3.418 143.646 0.077 0.092
12 5.68 143.368 0.053 0.062
15 3.942 104.311 0.042 0.067
18 2.684 120.072 0.033 0.083
21 > 1000 5.687 0.056 0.059
24 3.79 4.828 0.052 0.059
87
solving ILP is always larger than that for executing heuristic. We can also observe
that the time for solving ILP increases with the increase of jD0j. In particular, the
time for solving ILP dramatically increases for some given " when jD0j = 8. For
example, the time is larger than 100 seconds for FDBS when " ranges from 9 to 18
time units and that is larger than 1000 seconds for MDBS when " = 21 time units.
However, the time for executing heuristic varies in a small scale. The above results
indicate that the proposed heuristics are time-ecient and more scalable, which can
provide the real-time solutions against the disaster with a small early warning time.
5.5 Summary
We studied the urgent heterogeneous data backup across geo-distributed DCNs
against a disaster with the early warning time under a given set of backup resources.
To carry out urgent backup, two backup schemes (i.e., MDBS and FDBS) were pro-
posed, each solving by an optimal ILP and a corresponding heuristic. For dierent
types of data that should be backed up, MDBS can obtain the maximum amoun-
t of data that can be backed up, and FDBS can maximize the same proportion of
data backup for each type of data to achieve the fair backup for each type of data.
Numerical results showed that the proposed schemes can meet the dierent backup
requirements from dierent types of data and adapt to the disasters with dierent
early warning times.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the thesis and points out the interesting future research
topics.
6.1 Summary of the Thesis
In this thesis, we focused on the data center network (DCN) placement and data
backup against region failures due to disasters. We rst investigated the region failure-
aware DCN and content placement, and then we explored the homogeneous data
backup based on early warning of region failure. Finally, we studied the heterogeneous
data backup based on early warning of region failure.
For region failure-aware DCN and content placement, we investigated in Chapter
III DCN and content placement with the consideration of non-uniform distribution
of region failure in large-scale area. We rst evaluated the network vulnerability
by integrating the probabilistic region failure model with the grid partition scheme.
Based on the network vulnerability information, we then identied the optimal DCN
and content placement in the network such that DCN failure probability is minimized,
where the solutions for DCN and content placement can be obtained based on ILP
and time-ecient heuristic. The results in this chapter showed that our proposed
network vulnerability assessment scheme is ecient and also provided the solutions
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for DCN and content placement under non-uniform spatial and intensity distribution
of a potential disaster.
For homogeneous data backup based on early warning of region failure, we pro-
posed in Chapter IV the cost-ecient urgent backup scheme for homogeneous data
backup by fully utilizing the " early warning time. We also provided the scheme to
obtain the maximum backup capacity within the " early warning time. The corre-
sponding ILP models and a heuristic are developed to get the backup solutions. The
results in this chapter showed that our proposed schemes are disaster adaptive to
dierent early warning times ".
In Chapter V, we addressed the heterogeneous data backup based on early warning
of region failure. We developed two backup schemes to carry out urgent backup within
the " early warning time. For each scheme, both ILP and heuristic are proposed to
generate backup solutions. The results in this chapter also showed that the proposed
schemes can exibly adapt to dierent early warning times ".
6.2 Future Work
The interesting future research topics are summarized as follows.
 In this thesis, for DCN and content placement problem, each DCN and each
type of content are treated equally. Thus, one interesting future research topic
is DCN and content placement with the consideration of dierent priorities and
constraints as well as dynamic network trac.
 In this thesis, we divide the backup problem into two sub-problems (i.e., Backup
Capacity Evaluation (BCE) and Backup Cost Minimization (BCM)) in Chap-
ter IV. Then another attractive future research topic is how to jointly design
an optimization problem to maximize the backup capacity while keeping the
backup cost minimized.
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 It is notable that in heterogeneous data backup, dierent types of data are
treated equally. Thus, it will be interesting topic to develop urgent backup
scheme with the consideration of the dierent priorities for dierent types of
data.
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